The Weather Underground: A study in mobilization by Pigulski, Paul Michael
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1981 
The Weather Underground: A study in mobilization 
Paul Michael Pigulski 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, Political Science Commons, and the United 
States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pigulski, Paul Michael, "The Weather Underground: A study in mobilization" (1981). Dissertations, Theses, 
and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625157. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-svfy-tz10 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
THE WEATHER UNDERGROUND:
U
A STUDY IN MOBILIZATION
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Sociology 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Paul Pigulski 
1981
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts 
A u t h o r ^
Approved, August 1981
Edwin H. Rhvnj£U
This thesis is dedicated to the Vietnamese people, and to 
Hoa Trung Tran and Ngoc-Hao Phung Tran. I trust, their lives 
will never be subject to the sufferings their countrymen 
endured.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S  _ . iii
A B S T R A C T ............................................  v
I N T R O D U C T I O N ............................................  1
CHAPTER ONE - REVIEW OF L I T E R A T U R E .................  4
CHAPTER TWO - A LOOK AT M A N N H E I M ......................... 13
CHAPTER THREE - THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT .......... 19
CHAPTER FOUR - B E G I N N I N G S ..................................  25
CHAPTER FIVE - THE ROAD TO R E V O L U T I O N .................... 35
J
CHAPTER SIX - THE S P L I T ..................................  . 50
CHAPTER SEVEN - THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE W E A T H E R M E N ......................... 57
CHAPTER EIGHT - THE U T O P I A ................................  74
CONCLUSIONS  ...................   92
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................  97
iv
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the birth, life, 
and death of the Weather Underground Organization, a 
revolutionary group active in the United States during the 
early 1970s. The roots of the WUO can be traced directly 
back to the 1940s, and special emphasis is placed on the 
evolution of this organization through the earlier years.
It is observed that a definite relationship exists 
between the strategies of such a group and the doctrine 
which the same group adheres to. For the organization to 
survive, strategy and doctrine must be in general agreement, 
or at least have the flexibility to adapt to changes in the 
other.
This study, in examining both the Weather Underground 
Organization and the American society it existed within, 
suggests that the importance of this social context cannot 
be overestimated. Indeed, the conclusion of the paper is 
that, given the socio-historical context, the doctrine of 
the Students for a Democratic Society - its parent 
organization, and the strategies and tactics of the WUO, the 
birth, life, and death of the Weather Underground 
Organization was not only likely, it was inevitable.
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As much as any other topic, the field of social movement 
suggests itself as a primary target of sociological study. 
Nowhere is there as great a spectacle as the thousands upon 
thousands of people locked in a life or death struggle. 
Nothing can be more specifically sociological than viewing 
the dynamics and causes of such group action. To be sure, 
other variables are involved in such an analysis - economic, 
political, historical, psychological - yet, no phenomenon 
can be accurately represented with anything less than a 
holistic approach. This is not to suggest that what follows 
is an in-depth examination into the causes of social 
unrest. Rather, what will follow is a look at the 
mobilization process as illustrated by one group: the
Weather Underground Organization. This will be couched in 
the overall framework that Karl Mannheim constructed in his 
work Ideology and Utopia (Mannheim, 1936). Mannheim, a 
seminal figure in twentieth century sociology, is best known 
for this work, and, to a lesser extent, his work "Essay on 
the Problem of Generations". In Ideology and Utopia, 
Mannheim discusses the function of thought and perception in 
precipitating social movements. While the discussion of his
specific paradigm can wait until later, we should recognize 
here the hypothesis of this project: that understanding
thought, and its originators and context, can help to 
understand the conditions conducive to the occurance of a 
social movement.
In an effort to understand this mobilization, we shall 
select as our dependent variable the Weather Underground 
Organization (WUO) of the United States. Several 
justifications exist for such a choice:
a) Such a study may help to identify variables 
associated with terrorism.
b) We may be able to extrapolate from our results to 
consider theoretical terrorism.
c) This group has not yet been subjected to the 
rigorous study other, more famous groups have.
What follows, then, is a testing of the Mannheimian 
paradigm by applying it to a concrete example of collective 
behavior: the birth and life of the Weather Underground 
Organization. But first, we will conduct a review of 
literature. Next, a Mannheimian paradigm will be 
constructed. In the succeeding chapters, each component of
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it will be tested by a specific application to the WUO, and 
an evaluation of Mannheim*s paradigm provided. Finally, a 
conclusion will be presented, with suggestions for both 
replication and further study.
CHAPTER ONE - REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The amount of material written about social movements is 
surpassed only by the number of people actually involved in 
the movements. Our selection of material is facilitated if 
we focus on the actual issue at stake: mobilization. As 
such, a veritable deluge of recent literature presents 
itself - most notably the work of people like Oberschall 
(1970) , Gurr (1964) , Tilly (1968) , Davies (1964) , Kornhauser 
(1958), Johnson (1969), etc.
The first source to be noted here is Anthony 
Oberschall's Social Conflict and Social Movements 
(Oberschall, 1970). In this work, Oberschall supplies us 
with a classification index for the various strategies 
employed at different times by conflict groups. Oberschall 
demonstrates how conditions often determine a particular 
strategy or tactic as much as the group's professed 
program. Accordingly, his work offers itself as useful for 
our purposes in two basic ways: First, in showing the role
of each strategy, - and second, in delineating the 
particular social and group conditions conducive to 
mobilization, and ultimately, a social movement.
To a large extent, Oberschall*s work exists in direct 
juxtaposition to that of Kornhauser*s "Mass Society Theory," 
(Kornhauser, 1958). Here, Kornhauser argues that it is the 
socially atomized society which is most predisposed toward 
mobilization, arguing that when groups are cut off, 
mobilization is one of their most obvious options. By 
appealing to these atoms individually, mobilization can 
occur. Oberschall, while not dismissing the relevance of 
atomization and anomie, argues that - on the contrary - this 
situation usually inhibits mobilization. His argument 
states that it is by utilizing primary and secondary 
associations (bridge clubs, labor unions, etc.) that 
mobilization most readily and effectively occurs. The 
principal example used is that of Hitler's rise to power and 
his manipulation of various associations in doing so - 
including former army groups, ladies circles, beer drinking 
clubs, soccer teams, etc.
While Chalmers Johnson's Revolutionary Change (Johnson, 
1969) does not deal specifically with the idea of 
mobilization, his equilibrium theory is worthy of mention 
here. There are four basic variables, Johnson argues, that 
can predict the relative likelihood of a revolutionary 
social movement. These are endogenous value change, 
exogenous value change, endogenous environmental change, and 
exogenous environmental change. Since Johnson assumes that 
society is naturally in a state of equilibrium, any change 
in any of these variables not accompanied by a corresponding
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change in the others throws the society out of balance. 
Depending on the society’s ability to adapt to change, it 
either corrects itself and goes on in equilibrium or 
continues unbalanced in an accelerating fashion - ultimately 
creating the chaotic situation presumably conducive to a 
social movement.
Johnson's chief liability lies with his beginning 
assumption - that society is naturally at peace and that 
conflict is abnormal. In addition to classic sociological 
theorists like Marx and Simmel, others - including Mills 
(Mills, 1949), Lenski (Lenski, 1956), van den Berghe (van 
den Berghe, 1960), Frank (Frank, 1960), Zeitling (Zeitling, 
1962), Bottomore (Bottomore, 1965), etc. - have made that 
assumption questionable. Each theorist has posited an 
alternative to the "equilibrium theory" posited by Johnson.
In their respective theories, society is envisioned as a 
dynamic process, with conflict - not equilibrium - as the 
norm. Nevertheless, it is likely that Johnson's belief that 
dramatic change is conducive to social unrest is valid 
(Although certainly no more than its inverse corollary - 
that social unrest is conducive to dramatic change) .
Walter Laquer, in his work Terror ism (Laquer, 1975) 
comes closest to establishing a theory of terrorism. While 
it is questionable that the. Weather Underground Organization 
could be classified as terrorist, his chapter "The Sociology 
of Terrorism," nevertheless offers several variables which
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could be used in this work. These include organization, 
finance, intelligence, the arsenal, media support (or lack 
o f ) , popular support (or lack o f ) , and the effectiveness of 
counterterrorist tactics (Laquer, 1975, pp. v-vii). These 
variables are helpful in unraveling the "hows and whys" of 
the mobilization of the Weather Underground Organization.
Addressing the issue of mobilization is William Gamson, 
notably in two separate works: "Stable Unrepresentation in
American Society" (Gamson, 1966), and "Rancorous Conflict in 
Community Politics" (Gamson, 1967). Unfortunately, his 
assertions seem most applicable at the micro or community 
level of studying power rather than any discussion of 
mobilization. He does edge toward our topic, however, when 
he discusses "rancorous conflict".
By rancorous conflict, Gamson means "conflict where 
feelings of ’dirty,' 'vicious,' etc. are present. . ."
(A S R , February, 1966). By analyzing a total of eighteen 
different towns (which differ in the extent to which the 
towns undergoing shifts in political control and structural 
integration) he concludes that participative political 
structure is conducive to rancorous conflict (Gamson, 1966, 
p. 44).
More helpful than this however, is G a m s o n 1s The Strategy 
of Social Protest (Gamson, 1975). In this work, Chapters 
Four through Seven are particularly interesting, with 
Chapter Six - regarding violence - offering valuable
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contributions to our understanding of the WUO's use of 
violence. Since many of this paper's conclusions are 
consistent with Gamson's ideas, Chapter Six will be 
discussed more fully in the Conclusion.
Another type of general theoretical source is what I 
have chosen to call the "pathological perspective", one 
characterized by Crane Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution 
(1938) and Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian's Collective 
Behavior (1957). Whereas each have their own advantages, I 
have chosen not to utilize them because of their particular 
disadvantages. Whereas Brinton's model is static and Turner 
and Killian's dynamic, they both tend to view the social 
movement as somehow unnatural, objectionable, ultimately 
ineffective, and at least marginally pathological. Although 
this may be true, the concerns of this paper deal with 
mobilization and the relationship between doctrine, 
strategy, and tactics. So despite what advantages this 
perspective may bring to an understanding of social 
movements, it is not directly helpful to this inquiry.
In discussing the study topic itself, however, a 
somewhat larger number of works suggest themselves as being 
valuable. More than any other topical source, Susan Stern's 
With the Weathermen was used (Stern, 1974). An 
ex-Weatherwoman, this is Stern's personal journal of her 
involvement with the movement. Beginning with her Students 
for a Democratic Society - inspired radicalization, Stern
moves on to discuss her estrangement from her husband and 
the evolution of her own revolutionary mentality. Her forte 
is her psychoemotional insight written in an extremely 
personal manner. She is candid in virtually everything.
She admits, for example, that at different points her 
association with the group was for different reasons: 
security, sex, drugs, etc. Accordingly, the Weather 
Underground Organization gave her what she needed when she 
needed it. The book is punctuated with references to fits 
of extreme depression, periods of intense doubt, and lapses 
into what she calls "bourgeois counterrevolutionary 
consciousness" (Stern, p. 81).
It is a diary, with an almost daily recounting of her 
thoughts and deeds. As such, it is an extremely personal 
recounting. While this honesty is its chief utility, it is 
also the book's greatest deficiency - the lack of any 
consistent theoretical line or objectivity. As such, it is 
difficult to separate events from emotions. Of particular 
interest are Stern's characterizations of the Weather Bureau 
(WUO leadership): Bernardine Dohrn, Mark Rudd, Bill Ayers, 
Jeff Jones, Cathy Wilkerson, Kathy Boudin, etc. According 
to Stern, they are all intelligent, likable people - with 
the notable exception of Rudd. Taken as a
quasi-participant/observation analysis, With the Weatherman 
is invaluable.
Of significant value also is Weatherman, edited by 
Harold Jacobs (Jacobs, 1970). Strongly advocative, 
Weatherman stands as the bridge between the primary source 
and the Time - Newsweek commentaries.and analyses. That is, 
Jacobs used both primary sources and pieces written about 
the WUO - even when negative. Its value lies in the 
presentation of documents that cannot be considered either 
primary or secondary sources - that is, letters, 
correspondence, poems, etc. written by Weatherpeople.
Often, this correspondence was intended to be private and as 
such is remarkably candid and forthright. Consisting of 
fifty-six documents, Jacobs paints the picture of a humane, 
highly dedicated and motivated group of people. By using 
the documents selectively, we can complement our knowledge 
of the WUO.
S D S , by Alan Adelson provides the "opposition," in that 
it looks at the WUO from the Progressive Labor Party*s (PL) 
point of view (Adelson, 1972) . Beginning with the 1969 
split, Adelson details PL*s path for the next year.
Mirroring the PL line, Adelson seems unduly concerned with 
establishing the group's respectability among the working 
class. The analysis offered is valuable in that it does 
very clearly point out the Weather Underground 
Organization's inadequacies; notably elitism and 
self-righteousness. It is just as advocative as Jacob's 
work however, so of limited value.
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Cumulatively, primary sources offered a great deal of 
assistance. The various communiques, books, pamphlets, etc. 
were used whenever possible. Of particular importance is 
Prairie F i r e , by the Weather Underground Organization (WUO, 
date unknown). Their manifesto, Prairie F i r e , analyzes the 
world situation in Weather terms. It articulates the 
g r o u p 1s beliefs, attitudes, and strategies for ushering in 
the redemptive revolution so urgently sought by the WUO. 
While it is short and well-written, it is difficult reading, 
nonetheless, because of the group's excessive use of 
rhetoric. As a clear and accurate statement of the W U O ’s 
goals and strategies, it is unmatched.
In a more contemporary vein, issues of the Weather 
Underground’s magazine/newspaper Osawatomie proved useful 
(WUO, 1973-1975). Here current events are analyzed via the 
"Weather line." Rather than merely being an analysis, 
however, it illustrates the salience of group goals and 
beliefs in the perception of their world, or, as Mannheim 
would say, their milieu.
For a discussion and historical accounting of SDS - the 
parent organization of the WUO - SDS by Kirkpatrick Sale is 
unsurpassed (Sale, 1973). In its six hundred and 
ninety-three pages, Sale takes us from the embryonic 
conception of SDS in 1960 to where it is currently - the 
Weather Underground Organization. Sale uses a cast of 
hundreds to show the evolution of one of the most prominent
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radical organizations in American history from one of 
dedication to the goals of the Civil Rights Campaign to the 
obsession with a victory for the Viet Cong. It is a 
chronological accounting, listing particular events and 
their perpetrators. Sale gives us the conception and 
childhood of the Weather Underground Organization.
Quantitative research by its very nature makes it 
irrelevant and inapplicable to this study. The Weather 
Underground Organization is a clandestine, underground 
organization which does not lend itself very well to 
quantitative methods. Sampling, testing, representation, 
etc. are impossible - the Weather Underground would be most 
difficult to interview, deliver a questionnaire to, etc. 
Additionally, their record of cooperation with such 
endeavors is rather poor. There are very few interviews 
available, and these offer more rhetoric and philosophy than 
"objective" data. There are no participant-observation 
studies available.
CHAPTER TWO - A LOOK AT MANNHEIM
There are many things which render Karl Mannheim helpful
to our analysis, the most pertinent of which is his seminal
work Ideology and U t o p i a . Mannheim's value to us is that
his approach not only allows for, but actually demands, a
high level of objectivity in analysis. This viewpoint
demands an objective formulation of subjective outlooks.
While it is probably impossible to remain completely
objective and detached, the greater the objective rendering,
the greater the possibility of "real" accuracy. Intrinsic
in Mannheim's approach is a recognition of the relevance of
the socio-historical setting:
The principal thesis of the sociology of knowledge 
is that there are modes of thought which cannot be 
adequately understood as long as their social 
origins are obscured. It is indeed true that only 
the individual is capable of thinking. There is 
no such metaphysical entity as a group mind which 
thinks over and above the heads of individuals, or 
whose ideas the individual merely reproduces. 
Nevertheless it would be false to deduce from this 
that all the ideas and sentiments which motivate 
an individual have their origins in him alone, and 
can be adequately explained solely on the basis of 
his own life experience . . . thought in the 
concrete setting of the historical-social 
situation . . . (Mannheim, 1936, p. 2).
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This establishes the first major component in our
Mannheimian paradigm: the necessity of viewing all other
components in a socio-historical context. The need for this
component is really quite apparent. The scholar always has
the advantage of hindsight. To that end, it is very easy
for him to term an incident, action or mode of thought
"fanatical," whether or not there is any actual
understanding or familiarity with the incident's, action's,
or mode of thought's background.
The title of the work Ideology and Utopia provides us
with our paradigm's second major component: the
ideology/utopia dichotomy. These two terms will be used
mainly to describe types of thought patterns. For the
second of the two title concepts, Mannheim defines the
utopian state of mind as follows:
A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous 
with the state of reality within which it 
occurs. This incongruence is always evident in 
the fact that such a state of mind in experience, 
in thought, and in practice, is oriented toward 
objects which do not exist in the actual 
situation. However, we should not regard as 
utopian every state of mind which is incongruous 
with and transcends the immediate situation.
Only those orientations transcending reality will 
be referred to us as utopian, which, when they 
pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either 
partially or wholly, the order of things 
prevailing at the time (Mannheim, 1936, p. 192).
In contrast, (particular) "ideology" is defined in the
following way:
Ideologies are regarded as more or less conscious 
disguises of the real nature of a situation, the
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true recognition of which would not be in accord 
with his interests. These distortions range all 
the way from conscious lies to half-conscious and 
unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts to 
dupe others to self-deception (Mannheim, 1936, p.
114) .
More often than not, an ideology and utopia are two 
distinctly opposite ways of viewing the same phenomenon.
The utopian mode of thought is incongruous with the 
ideological mode of thought, for while the utopian approach 
demands a different reality (a "real" difference; a 
substantial change), the ideological approach attempts to 
justify the current state of affairs. It is essential not 
to confuse other terms with these two, particularly 
political ones. For example, a utopia is not necessarily 
"left," "liberal," or "progressive," and an ideology is not 
necessarily "right," "conservative," or "regressive." These 
terms themselves cannot acquire such near-universal 
meanings: they are dictated through the interplay of
several variables, most notably the socio-historical 
context. That is, when and where a phenomenon occurs is 
essential to any characterization of it.' Since there is no 
absolute definition of a utopia, it can be explained only in 
relative terms. Relative meanings of terms like "left," 
"liberal," etc. change according to location and the 
particular time of its expression.
The third component.in our paradigm is what Mannheim 
terms "The Forms of the Utopian Mentality," of which there 
are four. "Orgiastic chiliasm" is the first. This is a
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devoutly firm belief in the imminence of the utopia: "They
[goals] were felt to be realizable - here and now - and 
infused social conduct with a singular zeal" (Mannheim,
1936, p. 222). It is to be understood as different from 
mere support of an idea or commitment to it. The utopia is 
now imminent - worthy of any and all sacrifices to usher it 
in - it is inevitable. It is devotion and dedication in the 
ultimate sense; examples include the Anabaptists (Mannheim's 
example), early Christians, Bolsheviks, Hitler's 
Schutzstaffel, etc.
The Liberal-Humanitarian Idea is the second form. The 
key to understanding this form is the word "idea." It is a 
blueprint, a plan, a standard by which reality is judged and 
evaluated. Also capable of inspiring a person to action, it 
does not require the degree of dedication and monasticism 
required by the first form (Mannheim, 1936, p. 240).
Examples here may include the American Democratic Party 
under George McGovern, the Anglican utilitarians of Jeremy 
Bentham, etc.
The Conservative Idea is the third form. As such, it's 
utopia in the past: it looks backward. Examples might
include Pietism (Mannheim's example), the American middle 
class, and pre-Luther Christians of the Holy Roman Empire.
The socialist-communist utopia is the fourth form.
While this form tends to see society through almost strictly 
socio-economic terms, it rejects the haste of chiliasm,
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sublimating ecstatic energies to cultural values (Mannheim,
1936, p. 245). Examples include the current left wing of
the German Social Democratic Party, the American Socialist
Worker's Party, etc. Generally, this form is identified
fairly closely with the thought of Eduard Bernstein. As
Mannheim says:
The utopian element in socialism . . . represents 
not merely a compromise but also a new creation 
based upon an inner synthesis of the various 
forms of utopia which have arisen hitherto and 
which have struggled against one another in 
society (Mannheim, 1936, p. 240).
This is not to present these forms as being mutually 
exclusive categories: they are not. Rather, they are
heuristic aides for studying any given utopian mentality.
For example, it is possible to zealously work for socialism, 
rendering that individual marginal in Mannheim's typology 
between chiliasm and the socialist-communist utopia. 
Therefore, it is by combining various measures of each of 
these that a real understanding of any given utopia may be 
reached. As our inquiry progresses, each component will be 
expanded to include related considerations.
In summary then, four paradigm components present 
themselves as operational:
1) What was the socio-historical context in which the 
Weather Underground Organization evolved?
2) What ideas can be identified as ideological or 
utopian?
3) What kind(s) - if any - of the utopian mentality 
characterize the WUO?
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4) How does the mobilization of the WUO reflect their 
utopia?
By answering each question in turn, a picture of the WUO 
will be painted - a picture that is cogent and 
understandable because it is couched in a consistent 
theoretical framework: Mannheim's. The measure of the
proposed test will be how well Mannheim renders the WUO 
"understandable." With the paradigm constructed and these 
considerations in mind, let us now discuss the WUO's 
socio-historical context.
CHAPTER THREE - THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT
January, 1942. World War II was in progress, and events 
happened rather quickly: Germany and Russia were "bleeding
each other to death" in the snow of the steppes, Rommel was 
gearing up for another series of offensives in Tunisia, and 
Japan was evicting American occupants of Pacific atolls with 
increasing rapidity. At approximately the same time 
Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering was requesting Mussolini's 
help for a "final" push on Moscow, Bernard Ohrnstein was 
pacing in a maternity waiting room in a Chicago hospital. 
Minutes later, he was the fond father of Bernardine Rae 
Ohrnstein - later to be known as Bernardine Dohrn (WUO,
1971).
While the roots of the Weather Underground goes 
considerably further back - Bernardine Dohrn, their leader, 
go back only as far as January 12, 1942. As Mannheim would 
tell us, we must recognize the relevance of history in 
determining the milieu into which Dohrn was born. In 1942 
and for the next several years, the world witnessed a "baby 
boom." It was a boom that produced the participants in the
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struggles of the late sixties, including Bernardine Dohrn, 
Mark Rudd, Jeff Jones, Bill Ayers, Kathy Boudin, Cathy 
Wilkerson, etc. In 1950, when President Harry Truman was 
becoming increasingly worried about the cold war, on one 
hand, and Dwight Eisenhower, on the other, Bernard Dohrn 
(who changed his name from Bernard Ohrnstein to facilitate 
his career as a credit manager) was moving his family to 
Whitefish Bay, a suburb of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The 
following years were typical, as far as Bernardine was 
concerned: she received above-average grades; was active in
literally dozens of high school activities, becoming editor 
of the high school paper; joining Future Nurses, etc.
While the 1950*s are remembered in the United States by 
the activists of the 6 0 's and 7 0 ’s as the "Cold War Years" - 
years of stagnancy and quietude - there were socializing 
forces acting on the minds of Dohrn and her future 
colleagues. In the election of 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower 
became President of the United States running on a "peace" 
ticket. What followed were prosperous years - years in 
which the majority of Americans were more interested in 
preserving their economic gains than in adventuring toward 
new governmental programs. Hence, a period of "middle of 
the road" politics began, with Washington openly flaunting a 
"businessman's administration." With a continuing emphasis 
on a balanced budget, the Eisenhower administration and the 
country as a whole - were moving slowly but steadily toward
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the right. Despite the continued power of right-wing 
members of Congress, Americans moved closer to increasing 
their own civil liberties - especially after the Korean 
armistice. The hunt for subversives in the government, 
however, was intensified early in the Eisenhower 
administration, largely because of the influence of Senator 
Joe McCarthy. Large numbers of employees resigned or were 
dismissed; the administration at one point gave their total 
as 2,200 (Caute, 1974, p. 212). Yet, most of the serious 
security risks had already been ousted in the Truman 
administration. A study of some four hundred of the 
Eisenhower administration cases by the Fund for the Republic 
of the Ford Foundation indicated that in a majority of them 
the charges had been insupportable, and often reinstatement 
ultimately followed (Caute, p. 231).. In July, 1955, the 
Congress established a bipartisan Commission on Government 
Security to reevaluate the security program (Caute, p. 231).
Senator Joseph McCarthy himself plummeted from the 
national limelight to relative obscurity. His downfall 
followed his serious blunder in obliquely attacking 
President Eisenhower and directly assailing Secretary of the 
Army Robert Stevens. Before these attacks in January, 1954, 
the Gallup poll showed fifty percent of Americans began 
doubting McCarthy and only twenty-nine percent opposed him 
(Caute, p. 291). The attacks led to Congressional hearings, 
and even before they began, the Gallup polls showed
forty-six percent opposing him (Caute, p. 291) . For the 
first few days the hearings were a great national spectacle 
viewed by millions over television. Many people for the 
first time saw McCarthy in action, as he bullied and harried 
Secretary Stevens for thirteen days, evading issues through 
irrelevant countercharges and insinuations, and interrupting 
to object at every point. As the public watched, McCarthy 
seemed to change from a national hero into something of a 
buffoon - soon many people began to laugh. Nothing could 
have more rapidly deflated his demagogic power. Within a 
few days a bored public turned to other diversions, and 
television stations reduced their coverage of the hearings. 
In December, 1954, the Senate voted to censure McCarthy, but 
his hold over the American public had already largely 
disintegrated. He died in May, 1957, a ruined man, symbolic 
of the degree to which the nation had left behind the era of 
McCarthyism (Caute, 420).
Shortly after, in October, 1957, the Soviet Union 
announced that they had launched the first successful 
satellite, sputnik. As much as McCarthyism, sputnik caused 
a stir in American life. The long-held national 
complacency, secure in the knowledge of American 
technological superiority, began to crumble. Congress 
suddenly began appropriating increasingly large sums of 
money for research and Eisenhower’s balanced budget was 
doomed (Sale, 1973, p. 61).
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Meanwhile, Bernardine Dohrn was studying geometry and 
attending Future Nurses of America meetings. There is no 
record of her association with any leftist group at this 
point - even of expressing leftist attitudes (Sale, p.
131). This is typical of her classmates (and future 
colleagues) at the time, as the following figures suggest 
(American Teenager Magazine, January, 1957, p. 18):
TEENAGE OPINIONS (1957)
Statement Agree Disagree N/0
Newspapers should be allowed 
to print anything but military 
secrets. 45% 54% 1%
Police shouldn't need search 
warrants. 26% 52% 22%
Some groups shouldn't be 
allowed to hold public meetings. 25% 50% 25%
Police should be able to arrest 
people without charging them. 17% 63% 20%
The Fifth Amendment is wrong. 33% 32% 35%
Scientists are evil. 14% 79% 7%
Foreign immigration should be 
curtailed because it lowers 
standards. 37% 37% 26%
Foreign ideas and groups pose 
the greatest threat to America. 38% 24% 38%
These results show little support for traditional Amer ican
civil liberties such as freedom from unreasonable search t
freedom to hold public meetings, and freedom to know one ' s
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accuser and alleged transgression. Yet, the results also 
imply a fear of foreign ideas, immigration, etc. These 
results, together with the semantics of the interview 
questions, suggest a willingness on the part of the 
teenagers to possibly overlook civil liberties in the 
interest of greater national security - traditionally 
conservative ideas in this nation.
In the same year - 1957 - the Student league for 
Industrial Democracy (SLID) formed a student party called 
SLATE at Berkeley (Sale, p. 133). This group, whose parent 
was the League for Industrial Democracy (LID), had roots 
which went back to 1905. S L I D s 'longevity lent it a certain 
inherent respectability. LID history spanned the two high 
points of twentieth century radicalism of the 1910s and 
1930s. It was basically a social-democratic holdover with 
valuable skills in pamphleteering, chapter building, and 
conference holding. In 1957, SLID led a three-thousand 
strong student power demonstration at Cornell, a 
ten-thousand strong march for school desegregation in 
Washington, founded the Student Peace Union (SPU), and 
published the first issue of Studies on the Left (Student 
Peace Union, "Studies on the Left," undated). Then, in an 
effort to react to a sensed campus mood change, SLID changed 
its name - apparently in an effort to disassociate itself 
from the "older" LID. On January 1, 1960, much to the 
chagrin of the old-liners, SLID became SDS - Students for a 
Democratic Society (Sale, p. 184).
CHAPTER FOUR - BEGINNINGS
The turbulent sixties began in earnest on November 8, 
1960 - the day John F. Kennedy was elected President of the 
United States. Having won with a minority of states and 
with a plurality of only 0.2 percent, Kennedy ushered in 
"The New Frontier." John F. Kennedy was inaugurated on 
January 20, 1961 - not long after Students for a Democratic 
Society (Student League for Industrial Democracy had become 
Students for a Democratic Society early in 1960, feeling 
"industrial democracy" was too narrow a focus for their 
aims) had received a grant of ten thousand dollars from 
Detroit's United Automobile Worker's Union (Sale, p. 61). 
Because of this grant, Students for a Democratic Society was 
able to hire a full time national officer with the 
responsibility of strengthening and energizing the 
organization. The position was called "Field Secretary" and 
the individual hired was (Robert) Al Haber.
The fall of 1961 saw, along with the construction of the 
Berlin Wall, the recognition of Students for a Democratic 
Society - the WUO's parent organization - as a force on
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scattered college campuses. By mid-fall Students for a 
Democratic Society claimed a membership of 575 and twenty 
campus chapters (Sale, Appendix). Although the beginnings 
of the New Left were emerging at the time, they apparently 
left Bernardine Dohrn untouched. Having developed rheumatic 
fever, she transferred back (her parents had since returned) 
to the University of Chicago to be nearer home. At the end 
of 1961, while John Kennedy was putting the finishing 
touches on his Peace Corps - Students for a Democratic 
Society met in convention at Ann Arbor, Michigan. At the 
conclusion, Tom Hayden, a young yet precocious intellectual, 
was assigned the task of formulating an organizational 
blueprint, a manifesto. So was conceived the idea for a 
Port Huron Statement - Students for a Democratic Society’s 
manifesto (SDS, 1961, p. 1). Those in attendance could not 
have known it, but the slightly sardonic words at the bottom 
of their conference schedule would prove to be prophetic: 
"January 1st - the new left goes forth."
The following months were spent touring and organizing 
by Students for a Democratic Society adherents - and 
researching and writing by Hayden. His efforts proved 
worthwhile when his draft was approved at the Students for a 
Democratic Society Spring Convention at Port Huron, Michigan 
(June 11-15, 1962). The document begins:
We are people of this generation, bred in at
least modest comfort, housed now in universities,
looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.
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When we were kids, the United States was the 
wealthiest and strongest country in the world: 
the only one with the atom bomb, the least 
scarred by modern war, an initiator of the United 
Nations that we thought would distribute Western 
influence throughout the world. Freedom and 
equality for each individual, government of, by, 
and for the people - these American values we 
found good, principles by which we could live as 
men. Many of us began maturing in complacency.
As we grew, however, our comforts was penetrated 
by events too troubling to dismiss. First, the 
permeating and victimizing fact of human 
degradation, symbolized by the Southern struggle 
against racial bigotry, compelled most of us from 
silence to activism. Second, the enclosing fact 
of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence of 
the bomb, brought awareness that we ourselves, 
and our friends, and millions of abstract 
"others" we knew more directly because of our 
common peril, might die at any time. We might 
deliberately ignore, or avoid, or fail to feel 
all other human problems, but not these two, for 
these were too immediate and crushing in their 
impact, too challenging in the demand that we as 
individuals take the responsibility for encounter 
and resolution (SDS, p. 2).
Heavily influenced by sociology and C. Wright Mills in 
particular, four main themes were stressed: humanism,
individualism, community and participatory democracy (SDS, 
p. 3). It said universities - not factories or legislatures 
- should be the base for social change. This is a judgment 
which reflects the values and occupation of S D S s 1 founders - 
students and intellectuals. Accordingly, six precepts 
emerged (SDS, p.5):
1) A new left must largely be an intellectual 
le f t ;
2) A new left must be distributed in significant 
social roles throughout the country;
3) A new left must be young; it must continually 
recruit the young;
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4) A new left must include liberals for 
relevance and socialists for thoroughness;
5) A new left must be committed to discussion 
and controversy;
6) A new left must relieve anomie.
As a direct result, Students for a Democratic Society 
severed an umbilical cord with the League for Industrial 
Democracy by emphasizing the young and intellectuals and 
de-emphasizing the factory as a focus of social change. It 
also effectively alienated the "Old Left" - people like 
Michael Harrington - who were committed to legislative 
reform. Students for a Democratic Society was on its own.
While the summer that followed was in many ways 
uneventful for SDS, the autumn of 1962 witnessed the Cuban 
missile crisis. The national organization of Students for a 
Democratic Society was technically headquartered in New York 
City, but it was neither efficient nor centralized.
Although a great deal of energy and activity were expended, 
there were very few tangible results to be seen. Students 
for a Democratic Society was not even organized enough to 
publish a position paper. Nevertheless, two benefits 
eventually emerged from their silence: first, Students for
a Democratic Society recognized not only the desirability, 
but the absolute necessity, of a centrally effective 
organization; and second, their inactivity prevented the 
mistakes only activity could engender. Other campus 
organizations acted, but more often then not, their protests 
were misdirected, or their tactics inappropriate. That is,
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while Students for a Democratic Society did nothing, many 
other organizations responded inappropriately and actually 
lost support.
All the while, Students for a Democratic Society was 
growing. In an almost endless display of energy, members 
and organizers traveled the country organizing campus 
chapters wherever possible. By the fall of 1963, Students 
for a Democratic Society had grown to 1500, doubling their 
membership three times in three years (Sale, 1973, p. 73). 
Yet, their actual impact on American life was negligible, 
for in spite of the proclamations put forth in the Port 
Huron Statement, Students for a Democratic Society was 
ineffective. While Students for a Democratic Society 
functions were often brilliant affairs - sponsoring the 
likes of Paul Goodman, Herbert Marcuse and Tom Hayden, 
Students for a Democratic Society in practice was innocuous.
The 1963-64 school year was to be one of changes for 
Bernardine Dohrn, Students for a Democratic Society and the 
United States. Dohrn was now a senior at the University of 
Chicago. She would graduate that year with a Bachelor of 
Arts in history and spend her last year as a student with 
embryonic interests in politics. Meanwhile, Students for a 
Democratic Society increased their activity. Thousands of 
students turned from theory to action, from classroom to 
slums, going south to register voters in impoverished black 
communities, organizing unemployed workers in the decaying
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inner cities, running tutorial projects for black high 
school students throughout the North, even joining 
government - approved Volunteers in Service to America 
(VISTA) projects, poverty planning centers and cooperatives, 
or simply "dropping out" to live and work among the people. 
Having received positive feedback from potential funding 
sources like Walter Reuther and the United Auto Workers 
(UAW), Students for a Democratic Society moved into the 
community. Whether they knew it or not, they were 
attempting - like the Russian Narodniki (A Russian 
revolutionary group which looked to the peasantry for the 
revolution) before them to force an alliance between the 
intelligentsia and the people. As spring arrived, so did 
the mohey. The United Auto Workers, donated five thousand 
dollars, enough to begin the big summer push (Sale, p. 75). 
The effort was called ERAP - Economic Research Action 
Project. It was one of the Students for a Democratic 
Society's biggest disasters.
The Students for a Democratic Society learned a harsh 
lesson. Attempting to work with, and organize, the urban 
working classes, the students came face to face with the 
reality of social class. Suspicious of their efforts, 
residents refused to associate with the students. Because 
of their lack of street experience, the students became 
increasingly alienated and separated from the communities 
they were trying to help. As funding expired, so did the
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Students for Democratic Society's belief in the worth of 
their project. In addition, John Kennedy was assassinated 
in November. He was followed into office by Lyndon
Johnson. The aftermath of the Kennedy death produced a ream
of different explanations for it, none of them terribly 
flattering to the establishment, and the most convincing of 
which (to radicals in general and the SDS in particular) 
suggested the complicity of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the Dallas police force and Lyndon Johnson himself.
Meanwhile, in a conference from April 15-18, 1964, the 
Progressive Labor Movement officially formed itself into the 
Progressive Labor Party (Adelson, 1972, p. 4). It claimed a 
membership of six hundred or so, but the number was not 
important. The open, hard militancy of the group, their 
free acknowledgement that they were communists, their heavy 
influence on organizing the Black urban working class trips 
to Cuba in defiance of the government and their contempt 
toward the House Un-American Activities Committee, their 
analysis of the war in Vietnam as consistent with an
American "imperialism" - made it noticed and attractive on
the college campuses. With the exception of the Students 
for a Democratic Society itself, no other group was as 
instrumental in creating the Weather Underground 
Organization as Progressive Labor.
Faced with a choice between Lyndon Johnson and Barry 
Goldwater in the autumn of 1964, Bernardine Dohrn - as did
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many of her colleagues - began to feel alienated. She was 
now attending graduate school at the University of Chicago 
trying to get a Master of Arts in history. Before this 
school year was out, students would be thrust on the 
consciousness of the country as never before. The Students 
for a Democratic Society began another project - PEP 
(Political Education Project). Intending to support Johnson 
only because Goldwater was considered dangerous, PEP 
developed into Students for a Democratic Society*s first 
serious faction fight, with PEP and its adherents being 
decisively defeated by a stronger anti-political segment.
Then Berkeley erupted into massive anti-administration 
demonstrations. The Free Speech Movement really began on 
the California campus on September 14, 1964. While Students 
for a Democratic Society did not involve itself, it was not 
long until the significance of the event was felt within the 
organization. In an attempt to anticipate the future and 
organize for it, Students for a Democratic Society 
proclaimed solidarity with the protesting Californians.
Many campus students felt the impact of the event and 
Students for a Democratic Society gained from it. Even 
Bernardine Dohrn was touched: she quit graduate school to
enroll in the University of Chicago Law School - planning a 
career as a liberal lawyer. To her, the liberal arts world 
seem increasingly remote.
Suddenly, a dramatic change occurred within Students for 
a Democratic Society. Up until then it was an organization 
without a formal purpose. While many members were motivated 
by the Civil Rights issue, the formal organization did 
little more than offer the generalities found in the Port 
Huron Statement. In February, however, the guerilla 
fighters of South Vietnam staged an attack against an 
outpost at a town called Plei Ku, and on February 7, 1965, 
Lyndon Johnson decreed that America bomb the North, and that 
Americans in Vietnam be increased 800 percent by the year's 
end (Westmoreland, 1978, p. 114). Shortly, places like 
Minnesota, Illinois, Baltimore and Boston awoke: Students
for a Democratic Society's national office began receiving 
many phone calls, encouraging action and requesting 
direction. Students for a Democratic Society operated in 
top gear: Joan Baez gave it 10,000 dollars, ten new 
chapters were formed and membership increased to 2500 (Sale, 
1973, p. 81).
Finally on April 17, 1965, Students for a Democratic 
Society sponsored its first peace march. Over 25,000 people 
marched, including Staughton Lynd, the entertainers Phil 
Ochs, Joan Baez, Judy Collins, and many other celebrities 
(Sale, p. 111). In a period of approximately six hours, 
Students for a Democratic Society was noticed. The same 
television set which brought Plei Ku into American homes now 
brought in Students for a Democratic Society as well. That
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school year ended with 3000 Students for a Democratic 
Society (Sale, p. 140) . It also ended with a change in 
direction for Students for a Democratic Society itself: no
longer could the organization's approach be considered to be 
reform - it was now resistance to the war and, in a larger 
sense, the American government.
CHAPTER FIVE - THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION
The Washington march of thousands (see Chapter Four) had 
changed SDS. Kirkpatrick Sale, author of the authoritative 
S D S , characterizes the "new breed":
For the first time at an SDS meeting people 
smoked marijuana; Pancho Villa mustaches, those 
droopy Western-movie addenda that eventually 
became a New Left cliche, made their first 
appearance in quantity, blue workshirts, denim 
jackets, and boots were first worn by men and 
women. These were generally people raised outside 
of the East, many from the Midwest and Southwest, 
and their ruralistic dress reflected a different 
tradition, one more aligned to the frontier, more 
violent, more individualistic, more bare-knuckled 
and callus-handed, than that of the early SDS 
era. They were non-Jewish, nonintellectual, 
non-urban, from a non-professional class, and 
often without any family tradition of political 
involvement, much less radicalism (Sale, p. 423).
Not only that, but they were far from being intellectual
leftists. Few had read Marx and/or Lenin, Weber,
Luxembourg, Bernstein, or John Stuart Mill. Few had read C.
Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, Frantz Fanon and Herbert Marcuse
- they were not academicians. Their background was not in
social theory, political science, or radical history. If
they pursued their goals intellectually, it was probably
reading contemporary, advocative material. The motivation
36.
for joining SDS had changed: intellectual reason and
critique were downplayed (Sale, p. 461). What had set in 
was a combination of contagion and "political thought" - 
Students for a Democratic Society and civil disobedience had 
caught on, suddenly they were chic. The snowball effect on 
some campuses made a student "weird" if he did not 
sympathize with SDS. The consciousness that this produced 
was what Mannheim would have termed "political." No longer 
did the students simply advocate their philosophy, it was 
now customarily accompanied by a beratement of any opposing 
point of view. Battle lines were being drawn and the nation 
was becoming increasingly polarized.
With the advent of national notoriety, SDS developed a 
consciousness of its identity, not only reinforcing their 
political thought, but further assisting in the formation of 
conflict groups. Once the pro and anti-war groups were 
formed, conflict became increasingly inevitable. In the 
summer of 1965, SDS met at their annual convention at 
Kewadin, Michigan. Most notably, they amended their 
constitution so as not to exclude communists from membership 
and full participation. At the same time, the Progressive 
Labor Party held its first convention. It decided to use 
the war in Vietnam as an organizing tool and named what it 
considered to be the enemy:
We posed liberalism as the main ideological 
danger to the developing radical movements. . .
We estimated that liberalism had received a 
crushing defeat and had lost a great deal of its 
potency (Adelson, p. 101).
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Almost unknown to each other at this point, their (PL and 
SDS) coming association would be the Armageddon of American 
radical politics - that is, the cataclysmic end of this 
period of radical American politics. Never before, and not 
since, has the United States witnessed the raucous conflict 
that would soon come to be prevalent. The only point 
separating them now was SDS' ignorance of how to use the War 
in Vietnam as an organizing tool. While it had become the 
largest issue on the Left, seemingly only PL knew how to use 
it.
On Thursday, October 14, 1965, Rowland Evans and Robert 
Novak, the syndicated columnists whose two most important 
outlets then were the Herald Tribune and the Washington 
P o s t , accused SDS of treason for issuing the following 
proposals (Evans and Nowak, Washington P o s t , October 14,
1965, p. 41):
-- "Conscientious Objector" status was personal protest 
and hence, desirable;
-- Campus recruiting and ROTC should be protested;
—  Local draft boards should be demonstrated against.
Friday morning, October 15, 1965, SDS had taken two giant 
steps. First, it had finally issued concrete suggestions for 
using the War as an organizing tool; and second, much of the 
American public now viewed SDS as a radical juggernaut - a 
totally despicable organization. The next day U.S. Attorney 
Nicholas Katzenbach announced that the anti-draft movement was 
moving in the direction of treason, and hence subject to 
government surveillance (Associated Press, New York T i m e s ,
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October 15, 1965, p. 39). Monday, October 18, 1965, SDS was 
famous. From this point on, SDS was truly autonomous - able 
to rely on its own income (from contributions) to support 
itself. It was an autonomy retained until the end.
Walter Laqueur, in Terrorism, presents finance as one of 
the most helpful variables in studying terrorism (Laquer, 
1974, p. i) . Groups like Irgun, the Irish Republican Army, 
and even the Molly Maguires at one point or another turned 
to robbery to finance their operations. This he argues, was 
another kind of "terrorism" - be it more subtle - for it was 
the middle class who usually suffered from this kind of 
"reappropriation." It is extremely important to point out 
here that SDS never stole anything - theft was something 
they avoided conspicuously, and the Weather Underground 
continued the tradition. In so far as at least one variable 
is concerned (finance), the WUO was not terrorist.
To add fuel to the flames, early in February, General 
Lewis B. Hershey, the director of the Selective Service 
System, announced that college students would be drafted for 
Vietnam (Associated Press, New York T i m e s , February 11,
1966, p. 1). As SDS sprang into high gear, radical 
organizations throughout the United States came to recognize 
them as the Movement's vanguard. Even the Progressive Labor 
Party felt its goals could best be attained by working 
within SDS: Jeff Gordon, PL's president, applied for SDS
membership on February 17, 1966.
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Meanwhile, membership continued to grow. By spring 
there were 172 chapters serving 15,000 members (Sale, 
p.479). Still, Bernardine Dohrn was unaffiliated. Surely, 
her consciousness was developing: she became a volunteer in
an unsuccessful congressional campaign, worked one summer in 
an anti-poverty program in New York, joined Martin Luther 
King's crusade to push open housing in the Chicago suburbs, 
and gave her legal services on behalf of rent strikers in 
Chicago ghettos. It was during this last adventure that she 
met many people associated with the various radical 
projects, making friends and allies who would continue with 
her for several years.
In the summer of 1966, SDS met in convention at Clear 
Lake, Iowa - the symbolism of which must have been viewed as 
delectable by the participants. This was not intellectual 
New York or radical San Francisco - it was Iowa: the
backwater of American radical politics. And here was SDS - 
smoking marijuana, cursing Lyndon Johnson, and making love. 
The antiwar movement was now close to being considered a 
social movement. Here in Iowa it was evident that 
opposition to the war knew no single class, no single sex, 
or no single region. No longer was it confined within the 
cosmopolitan East or the cultural divergence of the Pacific 
West - now the rural Midwest was also in the "Movement's" 
camp. The new SDS adherents were not atomized individuals 
or groups as Kornhauser - who posited the Mass Society
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Theory of Mobilization - suggests: these were people with a 
considerable stake in the current system. And as Oberschall 
- who debunked Kornhauser, pointing to the utility of 
organizations in mobilization - suggests, they were 
mobilized through at least one prominent, common 
association, they were for the most part students, often 
recruited as groups, not merely individuals. Group after 
group - Midwest Students Against the War, Out Now, etc., 
were submerging their identities to forge a larger, greater 
whole - Students for a Democratic Society. It was at this 
convention that SDS first appeared as a separate group 
within a larger SDS containing PL as well. Yet, since their 
numbers were small and their influence slight, they went 
almost unnoticed. Indeed, SDS was largely unnoticed the 
next year. While they were very much in evidence on the 
campus, their presence was colorless. As much a part of the 
university as the campus center or bookstore, SDS "faded 
into the limelight."
Then, the summer of 1967 arrived and the counterculture's 
popularization began. There was the emergence of the hippie 
movement into a powerful and pullulating force in America. 
Here were the runaways - thousands of teenagers forsaking 
their suburban homes and high schools in favor of communal 
living. They crammed bus stations and interstate diners, 
looking for transportation to their mecca. Here were the 
orgies and the arrival of genuine "free love." Now group 
sex and its counterparts attained political status, for it
41.
was one more way to reject the values of their backgrounds. 
Underground newspapers such as The Se e d , The Great Speckled 
B i r d , etc. claimed readerships in the thousands (Learner, 
1972, p. 90), all eagerly devouring the "us-against-them” 
harangues that in the publications abounded. LSD became 
still another symbol of rebellion, as people began looking 
inside themselves for answers. The result - a culture built 
around phosphorescent paints, posters, etc. Timothy Leary 
(an ex-psychology professor at Harvard) advised America to 
take acid (LSD) and drop out. And above and through it all 
were the LSD-inspired chords and lyrics of revolution, 
delivered most prominently by San Francisco based rock 
groups - most notably vthe Jefferson Airplane.
SDS had grown to 247 chapters and 30,000 members (Sale, 
p. 501). By now it was without question the largest, 
best-known, and most influential student political group in 
the country, easily more important and dynamic than such 
preadamites as the Young Democrats, Young Republicans, or 
Young Americans for Freedom - it was now the only large 
student group on the Left. While it was by no means 
intellectual, it was the most articulate. It was also in 
June that Bernardine Dohrn had given up the idea of becoming 
a lawyer and working within the courts, and opted instead 
for a full-time life within the movement. That fall she 
joined the National Lawyer's Guild. What the month meant to 
Bernardine Dohrn in Mannheimian terms was a shift from the
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liberal-humanitarian idea to chiliasm. No longer did she 
patiently believe in planned, programmed social change. The 
feeling within her now emerged that since the "Movement's" 
success was inevitable, her input was necessary to expedite 
the triumph. As such, everything but political work was 
assigned a secondary role. Now she was a consumed woman, 
living for the movement. Totally consumed, all she lacked 
was a vessel for her chiliastic energies.
Autumn brought with it the developing PL-SDS conflict. 
Lines were beginning to form and sides were taken. In 
October, the politics of SDS moved from attempted reform of 
draft laws, welfare programs, student rights,, etc. to that 
of resistance to the draft, the police - all vestiges of 
American authority. The University of Wisconsin - a school 
with a history of radicalism, witnessed the first 
encounter. Representatives from Dow Chemical were on campus 
to recruit employees, so SDS greeted them. A major 
manufacturer of the napalm used in Vietnam, the action 
assumed a symbolic dimension - it was suddenly a 
confrontation between SDS and the American
military-industrial complex. Ultimately, the students were 
victorious and Dow was forced to leave the campus.
It was at this point that SDS began a major strategy 
shift. From its inception as SLID, SDS had employed an 
educational strategy. Sociologist Edwin Rhyne explains this 
as an approach designed to convince people logically and
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diplomatically of the correctness and efficacy of their 
programme (Rhyne, unpublished lecture March 14, 1976).
Since SDS was always composed primarily of students, such an 
approach seemed only natural. After years of frustration 
with the system and its seeming unresponsiveness to SDS' 
educational attempts, the students began - almost unnoticed 
- a shift in favor of a confrontational strategy. Gamson's 
(American Sociological Review, 1974) notion of conflict 
being likely in a pluralistic society, as well as 
Oberschall's idea of pluralism being conducive to 
mobilization when normal channels of redress are closed, 
gained more and more validity.
What confrontational strategy did was drive the wedge 
deeper between PL and SDS. While SDS concentrated on its 
policy of resistance, PL scorned it in favor of their 
"base-building." Citing classic Marxist literature, 
Progressive Labor feared that confrontational actions were 
alienating rather than attracting the much sought working 
class or "proletariat," whom they were desperately trying to 
use as a "base": something upon which to build a
revolutionary movement. Hence, they suggested a more 
subdued approach (which they felt the working class would 
look favorably upon), aimed at attracting the working class 
and building for the revolution.
At this point SDS was not building for a revolution, 
they were responding to social and political inequities.
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They were resisting - not revolting. While SDS was becoming 
increasingly wrapped up in the "Youth Culture" - donning 
dashikis, smoking grass, listening to Jimi Hendrix (a rock 
guitarist/vocalist), and making love - PL was cutting their 
hair, listening to Frank Sinatra (a musical favorite of the 
older generation), pronouncing against drugs and issuing 
proclamations against sex. Similarly, PL rejected alliances 
with proletarian-unpopular groups such as the Black 
Panthers, Brown Berets, the FALN (a Puerto Rican nationalist 
g r oup), Gay Liberation, etc. for fear of alienating what 
they perceived to be an increasingly conservative working 
class. They also rejected the "fun" of SDS, as Stern, a 
former Weatherwoman, calls it:
At the close of the sixties, SDS was like a big 
family spread across America. You could travel 
almost anywhere, and you would have an enclave of 
friends who would welcome you. You always had a 
place to crash, some food, some dope, and some 
sex. You visited your relatives, whom you might 
not have seen for a year, and exchanged all kinds 
of news; number of busts in your chapter or among 
your friends, best kind of acid, who fucked whom, 
growth of chapters, number of demonstrations, 
number of college dropouts. You got to know your 
family from coast to coast; you saw it grow by 
leaps and bounds. Your collection of buttons and 
banners grew with your war scars, and so did your 
stories. And so did your comrades. And so did 
your faith in the viability of the revolution.
It was a time of hard work and growth, but one 
was rewarded by a sense of belonging. One knew 
one's place in life, whom to depend on, and no 
matter where you were, you would be taken care of 
(Stern, 1973, p. 94).
What was evolving was a different society - perhaps a 
sub-society with a counterculture. They had different
values from the society on the whole, perceived phenomenon 
differently, and most important of all, behaved 
differently. They reinforced each other - financially, 
psychologically, and sexually: a strong, durable chain was
being forged. More importantly for our purposes, conflict 
group formation was almost complete. Any return to normal 
now meant more than a political defeat, it also would mean a 
dramatic change in lifestyle, something not easily changed.
On January 1, 1968, Bernardine Dohrn had a late 
breakfast, spent the afternoon walking through New York's 
Lower East Side, and then returned to her Greenwich Village 
apartment to prepare for a three week journey to Great 
Britain. By now she was a woman of undeniable 
attractiveness, of medium height, with long brown hair, 
vibrant brown eyes, sharp features, and an air of eclectic, 
no-nonsense energy about her. In March, she and Naomi Jaffe 
published a paper in New Left Notes (SDS' newspaper) which 
analyzed women's liberation in terms of imperialism and 
women's exploitation (New Left N o t e s , March, 1968). It was 
her formal introduction to SDS.
These six months - from January to June, 1968 - wrought 
a slow metamorphosis on SDS. Students began talking about 
giving the system "one last chance" and "went clean for 
Gene." Eugene McCarthy (an anti-war, student supported, 
liberal democrat who met with considerable electoral success 
in the primaries while running for President) inspired
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thousands of disillusioned students to take up his cause. 
Robert Kennedy, the epitome of vibrant, liberal yduth, and 
Martin Luther King, the pacifist standard-bearer of the 
Civil Rights Movement, were both assassinated in the spring, 
and the American judicial system seemed to be lagging in 
efforts to enforce integration legislation.
Although SDS' membership reached a new high of 100,000 
students in 350 chapters (Sale, p. 540), the effects of the 
McCarthy campaign were manifesting themselves: students
worked within the electoral process, forsaking, at least 
temporarily, the confrontation policies of SDS. Open 
conflict with the status quo was at least temporarily 
averted, and SDS was worried. It brought this fear into its 
1968 June convention. On Wednesday night of convention 
week, open warfare broke out between Progressive Labor and 
the other factions within SDS: raucous conflict had arrived
in earnest. In response, an alliance of disparate people - 
some actionists, some pro-working class, some 
campus-directed, but all disorganized and troubled by PL - 
was formed into a rival caucus. The caucus put forth a 
slate of their officers to be presented to the convention: 
for Inter-organizational Secretary it chose Bernardine 
Dohrn, for National Secretary, Mike Klonsky, and for 
Education Secretary, Fred Gordon. It was a position Dohrn 
was especially well suited for - her main duty would be to 
recruit and organize college campuses. On Friday night
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Dohrn faced the plenary to answer questions about her 
background and beliefs, as did the other candidates. In one 
of those answers, with only six words, she presaged the new 
direction that SDS would take in the final period of its 
history.
"Do you consider yourself a socialist?" someone in the 
crowd asked.
"I consider myself," Bernardine Dohrn said, "a 
revolutionary communist." She was elected without 
opposition - and only at this point became a member of SDS.
The summer of 1968 brought the Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago. While only about five hundred SDS 
members were actually on hand, the youth of Chicago supplied 
the manpower for the much-advertised demonstration. What 
followed were the riots and the ensuing radicalization of 
American youth. How much the incidents on Michigan Avenue 
actually affected America can only be speculated upon - 
although sociologist Kenneth Keniston feels it cannot be 
overestimated (Kenniston, 1968, p. 5). The election of 1968 
pitted Hubert Humphrey against Richard Nixon, and Nixon 
won. This was the final blow for thousands of youth who 
first eliminated Lyndon Johnson from the race and supported 
Eugene McCarthy. Time after time radical and disillusioned 
youth of America's campuses gave America "another chance," 
and every time their country seemingly came up short. The 
frustrations they were feeling were real - for other
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conflict groups (their counterparts: pro-war or simply 
anti-insurgent) were employing their own strategy - a 
manipulational one (they were attempting to implement their 
programme by manipulating the people in power electorally or 
legislatively). As Doris Kearns, biographer of Lyndon 
Johnson, pointed out, "As the war continued, propelled by a 
political process seemingly oblivious to their marches and 
meetings, this sense of hopelessness spread" (Kearns, 1973,
p. 200) .
Moving into that fateful spring of 1969, SDS was riddled 
by factionalism. P L ’s support was growing continually, 
largely because their perspective was seemingly more 
far-sighted and revolutionary. In response to this 
challenge, SDS National Office leadership, including Mike 
Klonsky, Les Coleman, Don Hammerquist, Jim Mellen and Howie 
Machtinger, set to work to fashion an SDS alternative. The 
result - the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM):
In order for SDS to succeed at this task it will 
take tremendous self-consciousness and discipline 
from the membership. . . Through collective 
political experience and study, a cadre can be 
developed who can bring these things to SDS. . .
The reactionary nature of pacifism, the need for 
armed struggle as the only road to revolution 
(are) essential truths which were not predominant 
in our movement in the past. . . We (must) 
recognize the urgency of fighting white supremacy 
by building the material strength of the white 
movement to be a conscious, organized, mobilized 
fighting force capable of giving real support to 
the black liberation struggle (Klonsky, Coleman, 
Hammerquist, Mellen, Machtinger, 1969).
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The paper condoned violence and revolution, declared 
solidarity with black liberation, and called for tighter 
organization and discipline. SDS-RYM was now employing 
almost exclusively the confrontational strategy, at the 
expense of all others - most notably the educational. 
Attempting always to be "more militant than thou," the 
various factions of SDS - most notably RYM - was also 
severely limiting its future growth potential by not 
employing the educational strategy. The immediate effects 
of such a decision were not evident: these were left for
the Weather Underground to discover. Weatherman was now 
just a step away.
CHAPTER SIX - THE SPLIT
This raucous conflict - the internal rivalry between 
Progressive Labor (PL) and the Revolutionary Youth Movement 
(RYM) - was brought into the Summer of 1969, and tore SDS 
apart. As Stern says: "The growing dissension in the 
National Office, and in local chapters between PL and the 
rest of SDS had been building toward a confrontation. We 
expected a big fight at the June convention, we anticipated 
chaos (Stern, p. 55)." In addition to the PL-SDS hostility, 
eleven SDSers - Karen Ashley, John Jacobs, Jeff Jones, Mark 
Rudd, Steve Tappis, Bill Ayers, Jim Mellen, Terry Robbins, 
Bernardine Dohrn, Gerry Long, and Howie Machtinger - 
published a paper entitled "You Don't Need a Weatherman to 
Know Which Way the Wind Blows (RYM, 1969)." In it, they 
pushed for a still more militant line than that articulated 
by RYM. The document's title, borrowed from a Bob Dylan 
song, was especially symbolic, since PL hated Dylan and rock 
music in general. As Kirkpatrick Sale points out, it was 
not a document without thesis:
But the most significant ideological force 
within SDS was a group of eleven New York and 
Midwestern intellectuals who had drawn up an 
analytical and programmatic thesis called simply,
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"You Don't Need A Weatherman to Know Which Way 
the Wind Blows" (the title is from Dylan -- a 
characteristic weapon for that group to use 
against P L ) . "Weatherman" was a 16,000 word 
paper which made the first and crucial attempt at 
defining an ideology and a program for SDS as a 
movement of the most aggressive part of white 
radical youth. As a basic platform, it was the 
first major overhaul SDS has had since the "Port 
Huron Statement" and "America and the New Era", 
long ago (five years seems like a century) in the 
organization's post-liberal infancy and puberty 
(Sale, p. 602) ."
SDS was behind it. PL was not. They (PL) "looked 
clean-shaven, neatly dressed, and grim. When they weren't 
sloganeering they and their supporters sat in well-manicured 
rows on their side of the room" (Stern, p. 61) . The entire 
convention was marked by chaos - people were screaming at 
each other, fighting with each other, or stamping their feet 
in unison. Organizationally and doctrinally, PL and RYM 
were far apart. Although both nominally a part of SDS, 
their differences were emphasized by the proximity of the 
various members within the organization. This was the 
"intellectual left" that Tom Hayden spoke of nine years 
earlier?
The second night of the convention, a small group of
Black Panthers came to speak. They began innocently enough:
After long study and investigation of Students 
for a Democratic Society and the Progressive 
Labor Party in particular, we have come to the 
conclusion that the Progressive Labor Party has 
deviated from the Marxist-Leninist ideology on 
the National Question and the right of 
self-determination for all oppressed people.
We demand that by the conclusion of the
National Convention of Students for a Democratic
Society that the Progressive Labor Party change
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its position on the right to self-determination 
and stand in concert with the oppressed peoples 
of the world and begin to follow a true 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. . .
If the Progressive Labor Party continues its 
egocentric policies and revisionist behavior, 
they will be considered as counterrevolutionary 
traitors and SDS will be judged by the company 
they keep and the efficiency and effectiveness 
with which they deal with bourgeois factions 
within their organization," (Sale, p. 605).
Stern recounts what happened next:
The Panther's speech, which had begun as an 
attack on PL had ended with an attack on Women's 
Liberation, included a remark about "pussy 
power". Their line was that women should fuck 
anyone if necessary for the revolution.
The room erupted into a seething mass of women, 
embarrassed and defensive men, momentarily united 
against the Panthers in defense of Women's 
Liberation. I was angry along with all the other 
women. I moved closer to the stage, screaming 
"male chauvinism" without much heart, when 
suddenly the Panther speaker shouted into the 
mike, "Superman was a punk because he never tried 
to fuck Lois Lane."
I saw red. The remark was stupid but 
infuriating. I stood under the stage screaming 
with hundreds of other women (Stern, p. 61).
What followed was absolute pandemonium. Alternately, PL
members, SDS members, and RYM members seized the microphone
to have their say. Order was non-existent; the Convention
was governed by mob rule (a perfect illustration of Gamson's
"raucous conflict") (Gamson, p. 24). Then Mark Rudd was on
stage, and the clamor seemed to abate when he begged
everyone to "cool it." Suddenly, Bernardine Dohrn wrenched
herself free from Mike Klonsky (who had been trying to
restrain her) and "marched to the rostrum, hair flying, jaw
set" (Stern, p. 62). Although virtually no one was able to
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understand her, she screamed, " W e ’re going to have to decide 
if we can stay in the same organization as these people 
(PL). Anyone who wants to talk about that, follow me into 
the next room" (Stern, p. 62).
There was a momentary hush. Falteringly, one 
by one, people around the room began to stand up, 
and slowly followed Bernardine into the next 
room. I watched in amazement for a few seconds, 
then ran downstairs, feeling something big had 
just happened. . .
Everything was in a bad state of confusion.
Someone ran up to me excitedly screaming, "We're 
leaving, we're walking out," and went careening 
off. . . Now that the split was upon us, nobody
knew how to react (Stern, p. 62).
Once outside, the group voted to expel PL. Although the
legitimacy of this act could certainly be questioned, SDS' 
sincerity could not. The "walk-out" leadership drew up a 
statement for PL, and then, in formation, the group walked 
out and seized the speaker's platform. Stern continues:
Bernardine was at the rostrum, with Rudd to the 
right of her, and me, by chance, standing to the 
left of her, and all the rest of SDS lined up
across the stage, covering it in straight rows,
standing, alert and proud, scrutinizing the 
audience carefully for any would-be assassins or 
attackers.
Bernardine was talking, waving her arms, 
pointing into the audience. Her eyes flashed as 
she traced the counterrevolutionary positions of 
PL. . . She finished it by saying, "SDS can no
longer live with people who are objectively 
racist, anti-communist, and reactionary. PL 
members and all others who don't accept our 
principles are no longer members of SDS" (Stern,
p. 62) .
With that, SDS began to diejzf. Although PL assumed the name 
"SDS," it very quickly became a title without an 
organization. Despite the election of Fred Grodon the next
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year (a convert from RYM, and an SDS veteran), the new "SDS" 
began to die. Local chapters withered away, leaving New 
England as the only geographic area - Boston, specifically - 
where their influence was felt. In 1975, (PL) SDS, feeling 
the title "Students for a Democratic Society" outdated and 
confining, changed the organization’s name to "The 
Revolutionary Student Brigade" and finally, to the "Attica 
Brigade." Outside of a 1976 incident at Harvard, when four 
members beat a faculty member in an elevator (accusing him 
of "racism"), nothing has been heard from the group since 
t hen.
RYM similarly tried to make it, but found themselves in 
a position of marginality between PL and Weatherman. Like 
"SDS," RYM suffered from a lack of centralization, causing 
local chapters to fade from a lack of direction. When 
Weatherman broke into PL's national headquarters and took 
all membership lists, contacts, files, etc. (1970), Mike 
Klonsky, Chairman of RYM, became so frustrated that he 
resigned and returned home to California. This killed what 
was left of RYM, and all further activity centered around 
two abortive attempts - in 1973 and 1977 - to revive New 
Left N o t e s , S D S 1 official newsletter. Of the three groups, 
only Weatherman retained any organization to speak of, 
although it was able only to retain a membership of 8,000 
(Sale, p. 824). One of the largest radical organization in 
American history was no more.
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At this point, the transition from an educational 
strategy to a confrontational one was nearly complete. From 
now on, even attempts at "education" were confrontational, 
in that Weatherman characteristically dared people to 
disagree with them, the threat of physical violence lending 
an element of realpolitik to the situation. What should 
also be evident at this point is that the WUO (at that time 
known as "Weatherman") was not simply born as the result of 
a series of coincidences, it did not happen solely as the 
result of a chaotic convention, it did not occur at the 
prodding of a singularly charismatic leader (Dohrn), and it 
was not born out of the state of absolute hopelessness as 
many - Doris Stearns, Sidney Hook, Michael Harrington, etc.
- would have us believe. The Weatherpeople were anything 
but hopeless . . . They believed their success was
inevitable. Rather, the WUO was the logical and natural 
culmination of a plethora of variables, many of which have 
been mentioned here. Rather, the WUO was a direct result of 
all these things and more, too numerous and subtle to 
mention. This is what Mannheim tells us: the WUO did not
occur in a void. Indeed, given the milieu and the 
socializing influences acting upon both SDS as a group and
■r
the people individually, the birth of the Weather 
Underground Organization was not only possible - it was 
virtually inevitable.
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In concluding our discussion of the split in SDS, at 
least passing attention should be paid to sociologist 
Chalmers Johnson's notion of "transfer cultures." According 
to Johnson, a "transfer culture" is the element of the 
ideology (in our sense, utopia) which tells the 
revolutionaries what is necessary to implement their vision 
(Johnson, 1967, p. 100). In this case, RYM and PL possessed 
mutually exclusive transfer cultures, mirroring the kinds of 
disagreement which characterized American society at that 
time. These differences centered upon the difference of 
opinion on the working class, a difference we have already 
emplored. Suffice it to say here that the WUO's vision was 
of a youth culture, embodying rock music, drugs, sex, and 
their romantic revolutionary heros. PL, being more 
sensitive to the values of the American working class, chose 
instead to emphasize their supposed similarity to the 
working class, effectively snubbing rock music, drugs, sex, 
and the romantic revolutionaries which alienated this 
working class.
CHAPTER SEVEN - SOC-HISTORIC BACKGROUND OF THE WEATHERMAN
Recounting the historical development of a radical 
undergound is not nearly as easy as a student organization. 
As such, it is nearly impossible to be exhaustive - 
virtually no one but a group member knows what really 
happened. Records are incomplete and often conflict with 
each other. With this in mind, it should be obvious to all 
that the author claims no responsibility for an exhaustive 
recounting of events. The Weather Underground Organization 
can probably be studied best by dividing their activities 
into three distinct periods: Period I (June, 1969 - May,
1970) *is characterized by the chiliasm (in a Mannheimian 
sense, a single-minded, all-encompassing zeal toward a goal) 
of the WUO. Accordingly, America's demise was both imminent 
and inevitable. Their strategy also reflects this: 
attempts at recruiting high school students, 
ultra-militantism, direct confrontation with police, etc. 
Period II is characterized by a decline in chiliasm, and, as 
a result, a less militant posture. Rather than direct 
confrontation, their actions assumed more of a symbolic
58.
purpose. It was during this period that the group went 
"underground." Finally, Period III is marked by a general 
decline in all activity, the split in the WUO, and most 
recently, the surrender of Rudd, Wilkerson, Ayers, 
Machtinger, Jaffee, and Dohrn.
Kirkpatrick Sale describes reactions to the SDS split:
The rafters of the Chicago Coliseum had hardly 
ceased to reverberate with the chants of the 
rival factions, when the ghost of Karl Marx was 
being heaped with blame for the SDS debacle.
"Alas," mourned Establishment pundits in 
ill-concealed triumph, "the New Left has finally 
gone the primrose way of the Old. Marxism has at 
last cursed it with factional wars and historical 
irrelevance. The apostles of ultra-democratic 
revolution and 'power to the people' (the most 
incendiary notion in the modern world) have shown 
themselves ready, if inept practicioners of the 
art of political manipulation. The idol-smashing 
revolutionary vanguard has again been revealed as 
a latter-day religious cult prostrating itself 
before patron saints and overseas meccas, while 
suppressing the heresy of thought with 
mind-gluing incantations (Sale, p. 640).
While there was a great deal of concern after the summer 
convention of 1969 for the future of SDS and American 
radical politics in general, Weatherman probably felt none 
of it, as Stern points out:
On the night of the walkout, I didn't worry 
about this. After listening to Bernardine, I 
would have followed her into Dante's inferno. If 
it was energy and brillance that enraptured me, 
rather than reality, I didn't care. I believed 
in the revolution with every quivering bone in my 
body. I was prepared to take on America, to do 
no less than save the world. I felt that I was a 
warrior of the people, and that I was fighting 
for freedom, that I had no choice, no matter what 
the odds. It was far better, I reflected against
}
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the mutterings of impending doom, to lose than 
not to have fought at all. Nor did I question 
the automatic assumption of leadership by the 
Weatherman faction. If I had any doubts, I 
repressed them? mine was a single-minded devotion 
that left no room for doubts (Stern, p. 164).
Shortly after the split, the Weather Bureau met in
Flint, Michigan for a "War Council". At this conference it
was decided that the United States was ripe for a direct
assult on the "State". The "Days of Rage" were approved for
that October. The scenario sketched out was as follows:
As approved by the last NIC meeting, the action 
will take place over a four-day period, October 
8-11. The scenario as it now stands will look 
like this:
The action will start on Wednesday night,
October 8, with a memorial rally for Che Guevara, 
who was murdered by CIA pigs October 8, 1967, and 
Nguyen Van Troi, the Vietnamese hero murdered by 
the U.S. October 15, 1964 for attempting to kill 
McNamara. A rally for Che and Troi and all other 
revolutionaries who have died in the struggle.
On Thursday, October 9, we will join with kids 
from high schools, community colleges, trade 
schools, etc. here in Chicago in an offensive 
against the schools. The action will be 
something around the idea of a "Jailbreak," and 
people in the Chicago region are already working 
with several high schools in the city to develop 
cadre who will help work out and co-ordinate this 
action. . .
Either on Thursday or Friday there will be a 
woman's action, planned by women from functioning 
political collectives all over the country.
Unlike other women's actions - which focused on 
the symbols of cultural oppression - this action 
will be an attack on the institutions of 
racism. . .
Thursday night we'll have a youth-rock music 
rock festival. . . Fuck hippie capitalism. . .
Build culture in struggle. . .
Friday we go after the courts. . .
And finally, on Saturday, October 11, we'll 
have the big march. We're starting to work on a
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route for the march, and will be seeking permits 
from the city. The permit however, even if we 
get it, will be no guarantee of safety. As on 
all the days, we must be prepared to defend 
ourselves in the event of any vicious attacks by 
the Chicago pigs. . . The plans for the four days 
are of course not finalized. Changes will 
undoubtedly take place. . . (Stern, p. 177)
Immediately, thousands of Weathermen began organizing
for the event. Time was spent printing, speaking,
leafletting, training in self-defense and
counter-insurrectionary tactics - in everything but eating 
or sleeping. For two months they labored tirelessly, 
convinced eight thousand would gather for the action. It 
was rather disheartening then, when only about eight hundred 
eventually showed up. A cold, damp night, spirits plummeted 
as the realization crept upon the crowd. At that point, 
members of the Weather Bureau - especially Bernardine Dohrn 
- began speaking, attempting to improve morale. They 
succeeded.
The benefits of charismatic leadership are illustrated 
here. This is not to suggest that the authority of Dohrn 
and the others was legitimized solely by charisma. Rather, 
as several analysts have pointed out - including Weber,
Brinton, and Gonzalez - certain types of leadership are 
better suited for different types of situations. In this 
case, no other types of leadership authority 
(legal-rational, traditional, etc.) could have sufficed 
nearly as well, for what was needed to reverse a 
disappointing turnout, foul weather, and the resulting poor
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spirits was not order, transitional (of power) 
considerations or the like, but charisma. It was this 
personal quality of ingenue or charm of Bernardine Dohrn 
that got the organization Weatherman started: without her,
the Days of Rage would not have happended.
The group left Lincoln Park and began moving south down 
Michigan Avenue - Chicago's Gold Coast. Here was the Drake 
Hotel, the Playboy Club, Gucci's and the Continental Plaza - 
all hated by Weatherman as symbols of cultural repression. 
Then they found the street blocked by the Chicago police:
With a galvanizing thrill, we all began running 
directly at the pigs. That's the last I saw of 
Beam. Around me women were fighting with pigs; I 
could hear the clubs smashing down on them. . .
As I turned, I saw a woman from my affinity group 
wedged up against a park grounds shack. Two pigs 
were working her over with their clubs as she lay 
there, her arms wrapped around her head.
Something in me clicked at the sight, something 
stronger than all the danger around me.
I galloped like one possessed right toward the 
pigs, who were smearing the woman with her own 
blood. One of them was bent over administering 
his pounding.
I stood behind him for a split second, and then 
I carefully lifted my pipe and brought it down 
with all the strength I had at the base of his 
neck, right where it was exposed beneath his 
helmet. He fell forward. I turned to find 
another pig towering above me. He rammed me 
across the chest with his club, staring at me as 
I fell backward to the ground. Then he grabbed 
his club with both his hands, like a baseball 
bat, and he raised it as high as he could in the 
air, as I had just done, and he smiled, and I saw 
the scar on his nose wiggle - then he brought 
that club down on my face. My glasses shattered; 
then I was spun around as another pig kicked me 
hard in the shoulder (Stern, p. 180).
These "Days of Rage" actually consisted of a number of 
separate actions. Various "affinity groups" (sub-groups
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within Weatherman organized around common points of 
reference: women, workers, students, Chicagoans, etc.) took 
their turn attacking "the State" as embodied in the Chicago 
Police Force. People would be members of different affinity 
groups, and, therefore, participate in more than one 
action. From all accounts, Dohrn participated in all 
actions until incarcerated. Coincidentally, she and Stern 
found themselves in the same cell. Stern makes the 
following observation of Dohrn:
Bernardine had hurt her leg, and was limping 
slightly. Other than the limp, there was no 
discernible reminder than she had just been 
through a violent battle with Chicago's finest.
She looked like a fashion model. Short black 
leather jacket, nice slacks, neat purple blouse, 
the boots - everything just so. She was 
reclining on an iron bench with one hand 
supporting her head, the other dangling to the 
floor, staring at the ceiling. Although she 
didn't move, didn't talk, hardly seemed aware of 
the other women in the room, everyone else was 
quite aware of her (Stern, p. 181).
By Sunday, the action was over. Estimates ranged at 
$670,000.00 worth of damage, 221 policemen injured, 60 
hospitalized, and 280 Weathermen injured, 60 hospitalized, 
and 622 arrested (Chicago Tribune, October 15, 1969, pp. 
1-2). Richard Elrod, one of Mayor Daley's chief counsels, 
was paralyzed from the neck down when he refused to let a 
group of Weathermen pass on the sidewalk. . . Yet:
More than anything else, the Chicago street actions 
made Weatherman a reliable national force. The media 
created a Weather myth: Weatherman soon became known
as the most militant and omnipresent of white 
revolutionaries. The Left, having experienced less
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aggressive but no less violent street demonstrations 
also gave Weatherman its grudging respect. But the 
"Days of Rage" were, by their nature, unrepeatable. .
They projected a commitment on the part of white 
revolutionaries to move into total opposition to the 
state, regardless of personal cost. Earlier and less 
one-sided confrontations had lacked such force. In 
this sense, Weatherman turned a possible debacle into 
a victory of sorts (Jacobs, 1970, p. 195).
Shortly after the Days of Rage Weatherman struck again:
and again in Chicago. The Haymarket Square statue was
perhaps the most famous police monument in the United
States, and it was toppled from its base in an explosion
that shattered hundreds of windows in the surrounding area.
Police officers reacted angrily to the destruction. "An
obvious declaration of war between the police and SDS and
other anarchist groups," said Sergeant Richard M. Barrett,
president of the Chicago Police Sergeants Association. "We
now feel that it is kill or be killed, regardless of the Jay
Millers, Daniel Walkers, and the so-called Civil Rights
Act," he went on to say (Stern, p. 183).
In addition to the Days of Rage and other ancillary
organizational activities, most of Weatherman’s energy was
spent trying to radicalize and recruit youth. Stern says:
The McComb action, now known throughout the 
country, was an action taken by nine Motor City 
SDS women at a local community college. We 
gathered outside a sociology classroom of about 
40 or 50 students who were taking a final exam.
We entered a classroom chanting, and barricaded 
the door with a teacher's desk. One woman 
distributed leaflets while the rest of us lined 
up in the front of the classroom, and we stopped 
chanting as one woman began to address the 
class. She rapped about how American imperialism 
fucks over the people of the world, and about
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people's struggles for self-determination.
Another woman spoke about how imperialism 
oppresses the black colony within America. When 
a third woman began to talk about the material 
oppression of women and the necessity to break 
out of subordinate roles and join the struggle, 
some men got uptight and tried to charge the door 
in order to get out and call the pigs. These pig 
agents were dealt with while a fourth woman 
continued to rap to the people and the necessity 
to take sides with the people of the world.
Somehow a teacher managed to get out a back door, 
and the administration called the pigs. Because 
of an unclean getaway, we were busted as we left 
the school on charges of disorderly conduct and 
assault and battery (Stern, p. 107).
She goes on to say:
Our high school attacks were largely 
unsuccessful as far as recruiting went. But the 
level of political consciousness was raised 
unbelievably among the kids. Wherever we went, 
we stimulated energy and emotions. Pushing them 
to the furthest extent, we confronted high school 
kids with their racism, the war, male chauvinism, 
and their ever-diminishing power in society.
Angry and defensive, they would fight back 
bitterly and sometimes violently in response. We 
never got discouraged, no matter how poorly they 
responded. We knew it took time for people to 
admit their lives were fucked up (Stern, p. 109).
Superficially, it would appear that Weatherman was again
employing an educational strategy. Education, however,
usually .occurs without coercion. These attempts at
"education" by Weatherman were, as Stern suggests, largely
unsuccessful as a mobilization strategy. Recruits were few
indeed, and the level of struggle was not advanced.
Meanwhile, the organization was reorganizing itself
socially into collectives. Virtually every major American
city claimed at least one collective, with Chicago, New
York, and Seattle being the most prominent. The emphasis
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here was on communism - in everything. Bread, music, even 
sexual partners were shared. It was a political existence, 
destined to create the new revolutionary vanguard, and as 
Stern points out, there was little time for anything else:
There was never any time to make a home out of 
what once had been a beautiful house. Extra 
leaflets were piled in heaps along with old 
Seattle T i m e s , old New Left N o t e s , Guardians,
Movements, and newer underground newspapers, 
since we felt it necessary to be on top of all 
the revolutionary news happening over the entire 
country. . . We had to know what we were talking
about in order to explain it to other people.
Behind the seemingly simplistic line was a 
complex series of political equations; each of us 
tried to understand them.
During the month of September I averaged three 
hours sleep in twenty four. . . I was always 
exhausted, along with everyone else in the 
collective (Stern, p. 114) .
Such was not without its sociological functions, as
sociologist Charles Tilly points out when he says: "The
most important element of organization, so far as impact on
mobilization is concerned, is the group's inclusiveness of
different aspects of social life. The creation of a moral
community is therefore an extreme case of
organization-building in general" (Tilly, 1972, p. 71).
This "creation" is what Mannheim calls "chiliasm." This
inclusiveness cannot be overemphasized in studying the WUO's
mobilization and will be discussed in detail in the next
chapter.
These were hard times. The orgiastic chiliasm of 
Weatherman demanded many things, especially money. As a 
result of the increased financial demand and decreased
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income, the group was forced to make many concessions, as 
Stern points out:
These missives from the Bureau would warn the 
collectives that we were on our own financially.
As a result of Weatherman politics - more clearly 
revolutionary - the old, liberal sources were 
drying up. Parents, convinced that their 
children had gone insane, or at the least, unable 
to relate to them as criminals and violent 
revolutionaries, started to cut them off by the 
thousands. . . (Stern, p. 184)
Faced with a decision on where to cut back, Weatherman chose
to retain their autonomy. What suffered was their
educational strategy - it simply cost too much. What this
did, in effect, was increase their isolation from the Left
even further and American society in general.
In December of 1969 Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark
Clark were slain by Chicago police under conditions
Weatherman found questionable. To retaliate, six Chicago
police cars were bombed (no injuries) that month (Stern, p.
186). The following months (until May, 1970) saw a gradual
decline in Weatherman’s militancy preferring instead an
"educational" strategy again. Time was spent
"electioneering" and especially in raising their own
consciousnesses. It had to be a very sobering time for all
concerned. If some white working class youth found
Weatherman intriguing, it was more often because of sex,
drugs, and violence than politics. As the last remnants of
the campus-based SDS disintegrated, people were defecting
from Weatherman in droves (Sale, p. 702).
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On May 3, 1970, Richard Nixon went on national 
television to tell the American people he was broadening the 
scope of the Indochina War by sending American troops into 
Cambodia. Across the country, hundreds of thousands of 
people protested the unconstitutionality of Nixon's 
actions. As Chalmers Johnson would say, people were 
reacting to an exogenous environmental change (the move into 
Cambodia) and mobilizing (Johnson, p. 160). At Jackson 
State University and Kent State University, national 
guardsmen fired on students, killing several on each 
campus. To protest, Weatherman bombed National Guard 
Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
In spite of their show of solidarity with youth, 
Weatherman was unable to recruit from their ranks. The 
reasons have been speculated upon for years now, with 
Weatherman's self-righteousness, chiliasm, institutionalized 
free sex, lack of an educational stategy, etc. all given as 
causal variables. While this is probably all true, it is 
probably also true that their failure was an incorrect 
beginning assumption: that the U.S. was revolutionarily
ripe. This incorrect assumption can be easily understood by 
realizing that the milieu of the SDS tended to encourage 
optimism regarding the possibilities of imminent 
revolution. However, for whatever combinations chosen, May 
21, 1970, began Period II. Again, the emphasis was on the 
confrontational strategy, but now from underground:
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Hello. This is Bernardine Dohrn.
I'm going to read a declaration of a state of war.
This is the first communique from the Weatherman 
Underground.
All over the world, people fighting American 
imperialism look to America's youth to use our 
strategic position behind enemy lines to join 
forces in the destruction of the empire. . .
Now we are adapting the classic guerilla 
strategy of the Viet Cong and the urban guerilla 
strategy of the Tupamaros to our situation here 
in the most technologically advanced country in 
the world. . .
The parents of "privileged" kids have been 
saying for years that the revolution was just a 
game for us. But the war and the racism show 
that it too is fucked up. We will never live 
peacably under this system. . .
This is the way we celebrate the example of 
Eldridge Cleaver and H. Rapp Brown and all black 
revolutionaries who first inspired us by their 
fight behind enemy lines for the liberation of 
their people.
Never again will they fight alone (Dohrn, 
undated, untitled communique).
Dohrn - the perennial romanticist - misrepresented what 
Weatherman was going to do (Although probably not 
intentionally - she could not foresee the future).
"Guerilla war" as a tactical component of the 
confrontational strategy is an approach which requires 
considerable support - something Weatherman did not have.
As sociologist Ted Gurr points out, "The principal formal 
differences between turmoil and internal war are variations 
in their degree of organization and focus of violence; both 
tend to mobilize large numbers of people, both tend to 
persist over long periods, turmoil episodically, internal
war systematically" (Gurr, 1969, p. 335). As we shall see,
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Weatherman's actions were much more of an episodic than 
systematic nature.
Weatherman departed from previous Movement mass street 
actions by initiating attacks against perceived symbols of 
capitalist repression - the police and private property.
This violence was not in retaliation for specific acts of 
police violence, but part of a publicly announced policy to 
"raise the level of struggle." This was based on a belief 
of the Weather Bureau that ". . . a  few bombs, and a few of
us who believe this, could stop a lot of institutions from 
functioning in this country" (Dohrn, communique). The 
following months saw literally hundreds of actions, the 
following being the most notable:
June, 1970 - New York City Police Headquarters bombed.
July, 1970 - Presidio Army Base and MP Station, San 
Francisco, bombed.
August, 1970 - Marin County Courthouse (California)
bombed.
September, 1970 -"Liberation" of Timothy Leary from
California Men's Colony, San Luis 
Obispo.
October, 1970 - Haymarket police statue, Chicago, bombed.
- Long Island City Courthouse, Queens, 
bombed.
- Harvard War Research Center, Cambridge, 
bombed.
March, 1971 - United States Capitol Building bombed.
August, 1971 - Department of Corrections, San Francisco,
bombed.
- Office of California Prisons, Sacramento, 
bombed.
September, 1971 - Department of Corrections,
San Francisco, bombed.
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October, 1971 - MIT Research Center bombed.
- William Bundy's office bombed.
May, 1972 - The Pentagon bombed.
May, 1973 - New York City Police Precinct No. 103,
bombed.
September, 1973 - International Telephone and Telegraph
Latin American Headquarters, bombed.
March, 1974 - Office of Health, Education, and Welfare,
San Francisco, bombed.
June, 1974 - Public release of Prairie F i r e .
The explosions killed or injured no one. In every case,
Weatherman called ahead to make sure no one was in danger.
Indeed, only three people have ever died because of
Weatherman: three of their own members. On March 6, 1970,
Ted Gold, Diana Oughton, and Terry Robbins were accidentally
killed in a Greenwich Village explosion. As Robbins and
Oughton were busily at work making bombs, one of them
accidentally completed a circuit - and rocked the entire
block with the ensuing explosion. Five people (including
Kathy Boudin and Cathy Wilkerson) stumbled out amid the
flames to be helped by the wives of Dustin Hoffman and Henry
Fonda (Time Magazine, March 23, 1970, p. 30). They were
never seen again, immediately going underground. The event
had its effect on Weatherman:
. . . It has been nine months since the 
townhouse explosion. In that time, the future of 
our revolution has changed decisively . . . the
townhouse forever destroyed our belief that armed 
struggle is the only real revolutionary struggle.
• •
It is time for the movement to go out into the 
air, to organize, to risk calling rallies and
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demonstrations, to convince . . . that mass
actions do make a difference.
This tendency to consider only bombings or 
picking up the gun as revolutionary, with the 
glorification of the heavier the better, we've 
called the military error. . .
Because we are fugitives, we could not go near 
the movement . . .  we can't wait to organize 
people until we get ourselves together any more 
than we can act without being together. They 
must go on at the same time. None of these 
changes that people are going through are rules 
and principles. We are in many different regions 
of the country and are building different kinds 
of organizations and leaders. It's not coming 
together into one organization, or paper 
structure of factions or coalitions. It's a New 
Nation that will grow out of the struggles of the 
next year (Dohrn, communique) .
The movement never rematerialized as Dohrn had hoped. The
last bombings by Weatherman (of Kennecott Corporation, in
Salt Lake City, Utah on September 4, 1975) ushered in a new
era for the organization, as symbolized by their name change
which occurred at that point. Feeling that "Weatherman" was
a sexist name, the organization officially changed it to the
Weather Underground Organization (WUO).
Since that time, the WUO has occupied themselves almost
exclusively with the educational strategy again, almost
completely forsaking the confrontational. With the notable
exception of their work during the Boston busing crisis,
(the summer of 1976), they have relied upon media to carry
their cause. In September, 1975, the group agreed to sit
for a documentary by director/producer Emile de Antonio on
them. Still in circulation, the film has net thousands of
dollars, presumably channelled back into the coffers of
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the WUO and other allied groups (REI F i l m s , p. 2) . Added 
publicity was achieved when the Los Angeles Federal Grand 
Jury investigated its production, sentencing several people 
to jail for not divulging incriminating information.
In the spring of 1975, they also began publication of 
Qsawatomie. Published regularly through July of 1976, it 
has not been seen since. While the publication provided 
news of the organization and also a "Weather" interpretation 
of events, its chief utility was probably as an organizing 
tool. Through its above-ground support apparatus, the John 
Brown Book Club, and more recently, the Prairie Fire 
Organizing Committee, the WUO has been able to not only 
print and distribute Qsawatomie, but collect money and 
recruit people.
The following year saw a complete termination of 
organized WUO activity, and in July of 1977, two 
Weatherpeople - Larry Weiss and Peter Clapp - surrendered to 
authorities in Chicago. Later in the year Mark Rudd 
surrendered in New York, followed by Naomi Jaffe and Howie 
Machtinger. All have refused to turn state's evidence, all 
have pleaded "guilty" and all are paroled, organizing either 
in Berkeley or New York City. Rudd, for example, was seen 
leading at least two anti-apartheid demonstrations at 
Columbia University (Springfield Journal-Register, 
"Yesterday's Radicals," May 14, 1980, p. 31): while working
full time as a construction worker and living with his
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father. The group, moreover, was rocked by bitter quarrels 
over whether the fugitives should try to change U.S. society 
from above ground. The dispute was drawn along the lines of 
gender. Rudd, Clapp, Weiss, etc. felt that society can best 
be changed by organizing openly. The women, including 
Dohrn, Wilkerson, Boudin, seemed content with their 
underground approach.
In January, 1978, the WUO raised its head again. Five 
members, including Leslie Ann Mullin, Judith Emily Bissell, 
Clayton Van Lydegraff, Marc Curtis Perry, and Michael 
Justesen (Stern's ex-lover) were arrested in California by 
FBI infiltrators while attempting to develop an anti-Ku Klux 
Klan unit for the International Women's Convention. After 
admitting to "counterrevolutionary" charges in 1978 (Mother 
Jones Magazine, July, 1978, p. 14), Dohrn surrendered to a 
Federal magistrate in Chicago in December, 1980, in what may 
be the last major date in the history of the WUO.
Accompanied by her attorney and sister, Dohrn said she 
"regretted nothing," and was immediately released on bond 
(Chicago Tribune, December 22, 1980, p. 1), pending trial.
CHAPTER EIGHT - THE UTOPIA
As complex and interrelated as the preceding story is, 
our analysis of the utopia of the Weather Underground 
Organization will attempt to link their thought to their 
deed. In looking at their actions and pronouncements, six 
main variables suggest themselves as being of particular 
import: chiliasm, violence, communism communality, (the
distinction being that the former denotes a 
political/economic belief system, the latter a system of 
sharing everything between WUO members), anti-racism, and 
anti-sexism. Cognizant of Mannheim's "Forms of the Utopian 
Mentality," the WUO is characterizable as chiliastic 
primarily, with a subtle shift toward the
socialist-communist utopia discernible toward the end. This 
chiliasm was first inspired by an anticipation of American 
defeat in Vietnam:
As people who are located inside the monster, 
revolutionary Americans are in a position to do 
decisive damage to the U.S. ruling class' plans 
to continue and expand its world rule. The 
upcoming U.S. defeat in Vietnam will be a vital 
blow to those plans; we must aim to do everything 
we can to speed up that effect (Gold, 1969, p. 2).
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Written by Ted Gold, he did not live to witness this 
armageddon. Yet, it would be incorrect to assume that 
Vietnam was the only reason to anticipate catastrophe.
Rather, the WUO continued to see an impending doom for 
America, as recounted in Qsawatomie:
Sometimes, people get discouraged about the 
prospects for revolution in the U.S. After all,
U.S. imperialism is so big and powerful. But the 
strength of imper ialism--its tentacles reaching 
into far corners of the globe to grab up wealth 
and power--is really its strategic weakness.
Each corner is another vulnerable point, each 
dominated people a potential Vietnam (WUO, 1975, 
p. 15) .
From the same issue:
Make no mistake about it: storm clouds are
building up on the horizon. U.S. imperialism, 
substantially weakened by Vietnam and under 
attack around the world, has entered the stage of 
decline . . . Everyone is angry, and anger is
moving people into strikes, protest, and action 
(WUO, 1975, p. 1) .
Commanding a dedication to revolution with a singular zeal,
the WUO took their revolution seriously. Accordingly, there
was no time for anything but that revolution, which Mark
Rudd told Susan Stern in 1969: "The revolution isn't fun.
It's not supposed to be. We don't have time to play
around. America is in her death throes . . . The way you
are right now, Susan, you'd hold back the entire collective"
(Stern, p. 66).
As discussed earlier, failures of the WUO to recruit and
effectively build a base effected their strategies. It also
effected their chiliasm, diluting it into what must be
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called a " socialist-comInunist,, utopia. Witness the changes 
that the introduction of Prairie Fire wrought:
We are a guerilla organization. We are 
communist women and men, underground in the 
United States for more than four years . . . Our
intention is to disrupt the empire . . .  to
engage the enemy . . .  to encourage the 
people . . .  to forge an underground . . .  a 
clandestine political organization engaged in 
every form of struggle, protected from the eyes 
and weapons of the state, a base against 
repression, to accumulate lessons, experience and
constant practice, a base from which to attack 
(WUO, 1975, p. 1).
Note the emphasis on preparing for the attack rather than
actually attacking. Rather than admit to any trace of
frustration or disillusionment over the failure of the Viet
Cong's victory to produce an American revolution, the WUO
established "periodic goals":
This is a call to organize the people and to 
act. ,We must now apply our analysis to our 
particular situation, mobilize the masses and 
fight. Our goal for this period is to help build 
a mass anti-imperialist movement and to build the 
armed struggle, the guerilla forces. Legal and 
clandestine struggle are both necessary: 
agitation and attack, peaceful methods and 
violent methods, sometimes organizing the people 
step-by-step, and sometimes taking a leap through 
action to a new level. Mass work and armed 
struggle are united in revolution; each needs to 
support and affirm and complement the other.
These are different fronts, interdependent and 
allied against the common enemy (WUO, 1979, p.
39) .
Often vacillating between these two forms of the utopian 
mentality, the WUO can often be accused of inconsistency. 
Since 1975, the socialist-communist form is probably most 
characteristic, however.
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Unlike the particular form of the WUO's utopian 
mentality, our remaining five variables are consistent 
virtually throughout the WUO's history. Of singular 
importance is violence, the WUO variety seemingly derived 
from Chernyshevsky, a Russian intellectual of the nineteenth 
century, (What is to Be Done?, Chernyshevsky, 1898). 
Accordingly, a "decent," "real," or "new" man finds his 
highest interest, the most satisfying sensual pleasure, in 
serving the interests of society. Ultimately, the theory 
becomes a rationalization of political violence and 
terrorism, as it becomes the "new" man's moral and ethical 
duty to enlighten the masses. Nowhere does there exist a 
better statement of WUO policy on this topic than in 
Politics in Comm a n d , a pamphlet written by Celia Sojourn and
Billy Ayers:
There are many on the left who self-righteously 
condemn all violence of revolutionaries. They 
are keeping their own hands clean by avoiding the 
full consequences of revolutionary ideas. For 
these people, the revolution will happen only 
some day and hopefully be made by someone else.
But power concedes nothing without a demand.
Armed struggle is an extension of political 
struggle, just as war is politics with 
bloodshed. Under certain historical conditions 
political struggle leads necessarily to armed 
conflict. When a small ruling class maintains 
itself in power by force and violence, when the 
masses of people are forced to live and work in 
brutalized and violent conditions, political 
struggle both peaceful and violent is the 
inevitable result (WUO, 1976, p. 1).
Rebuking Arendt, who, in On Violence, felt violence and
politics to be mutually exclusive (Arendt, 1948), Ayers and
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Sojourn were attempting to qualify the uses of violence, and 
also tone down the following, from Prairie F i r e ;
Militancy stirs the imagination and raises the 
vision of victory . . .  A movement has no reason 
to exist it it doesn't fight . . . fighting the
enemy must be its reason for being. . . (WUO,
1975, p. 144).
More than any other thing about the WUO, their violent
method has endeared them to many romantics. As Jefferson
Airplane sings "Diana (Oughton) . . . Huntress of the moon
and a Weatherwoman, Diana. . .11 (Jefferson Airplane, "Diana"
from Sunfighter, 1971).
The traditional counter-argument of other leftists to
the WUO reasoning is that since the tools of violence are so
overwhelmingly in the hands of the state, it is better to
wait until an unquestionably more favorable opportunity.
Perhaps taking heed of Bernadette Devlin's precept ("Dare to
Struggle, Dare to Win") that a revolutionary group's
greatest weakness is the belief in that weakness, the WUO
responds:
In order to stop the slaughter of the people, 
we must accelerate the slaughter of the pigs.
Those who can't stand the sight of blood, 
especially their own, should stay home and pray 
for those who come outside to move, to do it, and 
pray for victory and not for an end to the 
slaughter. Pray for us to .win, because if we win 
you will be safe. If we lose, then kiss the baby 
goodbye . . we argued that militarily there is 
not likely to be a massacre on the order of a 
hundred dead, but that if a few of us did get 
killed while fighting in solidarity with the VC 
in the stipulated context, it would not be a bad 
thing. . . (Jacobs, p. 244).
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Sensing cowardice among members of the New Left toward 
confrontation, the WUO went further, trying all the while to 
glorify violence, presumably making it more palatable. From 
the Weather Songbook:
LAY, ELROD, LAY
(to the tune of "Lay, Lady, Lay")
Lay Elrod Lay
Lay in the street for awhile
Stay Elrod stay
Stay in your bed for awhile
You thought you could stop the Weatherman 
But up-front people put you on your can
Stay Elrod stay
Stay in your iron lung
Play Elrod play
Play with your toes for awhile
You thought the Weatherman was pretty green 
But we were the heaviest that you'd ever seen 
(WUO, Weather Songbook, undated)
A n d :
FA LA LA LA LA
(to the tune of "Deck the Halls With Boughs of 
Holly")
Deck the pigs out on the pavement 
FA la la la la la la la la 
We are now a fighting movement 
FA la la la la la la la la 
Don we now our boots and helmets 
FA la la la la la la la la 
We used to talk but now we do it
FA la la la la la la la la (WUO, Weather 
Songbook, undated)
To summarize, the WUO of late seemed to believe that
violence is not always necessary, but when it is, not to be
shirked. Becoming increasingly sophisticated, the WUO
always
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justified any individual act of violence. The following are
parts of a poem by women in the WUO, justifying violence (or
terror) :
They call it terror
if you are few
and have no B-52's
if you are not a head of state
terror is only if you are dispossessed
and have only your own two hands.
Sisters and brothers, think hard before your jump
onto the bandwagon
of condemning terrorism
remember who is making the definitions
remember not to strengthen the hand
that will turn in an instant
against every means of resistance to oppression
That bandwagon rolls straight toward fascism
do not forget the real terrorists
that lurk behind the masks of heads of state
do not be afraid to hold strong together
with all who dare to struggle.
Brothers and sisters, let us choose
our weapons carefully and humanely
let us use no torture
or napalm
or genocide
but do not be fooled
there is no weapon they will allow
nothing that works will be called legitimate
(WUO, Poems by Women in the Weather Underground,
undated).
Lending itself to our characterization of it as being 
increasingly socialist-communist, is the third variable in 
the W U O 's utopia - international communism.
Marxism-Leninism was the preferred belief of the WUO:
Our goal is to build communist organization 
toward the stage where armed struggle becomes a 
mass phenomenon led by a Marxist-Leninist party: 
a revolutionary stage. Organization unites and 
builds, and means that each d a y ’s efforts add 
up. Organization is made up of individuals but
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is bigger and longer lasting than any one 
individual. Individuals are precious but 
organization is decisive. Only organization 
allows continuity of experience and leadership, 
and carries the deeds of the individual fighters 
beyond themselves into the future. Organization 
capable of waging full internal political 
struggle around direction, and capable of uniting 
in action directs people's energies like a 
spear. Only combative organization can resist 
infiltration and repression and combat the highly 
organized and trained forces of the state (WUO,
1975, p. 4).
At the basis of this communism was the ever present 
necessity of "class" as an independent variable:
Class struggle, at times hidden and then more 
open, assumes a wide variety of forms. There is 
an immediate response to conditions of 
oppression: a gut hatred of "the rich" or a
worker's refusal to be pushed into a blistering 
work pace. On a more organized level classes 
contend over the share and use of social wealth: 
workers strike for better wages, working class 
women demonstrate for child-care. As the 
struggle develops, bourgeois social power is 
challenged: workers occupy factories, a movement
grows against the war in Vietnam.
The bourgeois class for its part does 
everything in its power to disguise, mute, hold 
back and crush the development of class 
struggle. It cultivates and enforces false 
consciousness and division within the working 
class. It develops and uses white racism.
Revolutionary leadership is needed to forge full 
class consciousness, organization and unity of 
purpose in the working class as a whole. Then 
class struggle becomes political struggle, 
ultimately the struggle for the ownership of the 
means of production and power over the direction 
of the whole society (WUO, Summer, 1975, p. 21).
While the "orthodox leftists" rejected the "tailist"
(the seemingly non-original adoption of classical
Marxism/Leninism) of the Weather Underground Organization,
the group delved deeper and deeper into Marxism, focusing on
increasingly obscure theories:
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There were many objections to studying Marxism- 
Leninism, as well as great suspicion. Some 
members argued that Marxism would push us to the 
right, that most Marxists in the U.S. ended up 
opportunist. Others felt it didn't apply to 
women. When the study finally started, we 
realized that most members had never studied 
Marxism-Leninism. And our study has liberated a 
new spirit in us, a hunger for knowledge and 
ideology. We have embraced a world view in which 
human beings are at the center of history, for it 
is the unique quality of people to reflect on 
their experience, to learn from the past and to 
project into the future. It is this 
consciousness and self-consciousness--this social 
and political responsibility--which gives to 
human beings the ability to change to world (WUO, 
Autumn, 1975, p. 4).
Perhaps the WUO was "tailist." The following from Prairie
Fire would tend to substantiate such a charge:
The quality of life of Chinese peasant is 
better than ours. The Chinese have free and 
adequate health care, a meaningful political 
education, productive work, a place to live, 
something to eat and each has a sense of her or 
himself as part of a whole people's shared 
historical purpose. We may eat more and have 
more access to gadgets, but we are constantly 
.drivien by competition, insecurity, uncertainty 
and fear. Work is wasteful and meaningless and 
other people are frightening and hateful. This 
is no way to live (WUO, Weather Songbook, 
undated).
While the Weather Underground was public in their 
admiration of China and Mao, two things make them and their 
utopia different from orthodox communism. First, the WUO 
put a very heavy emphasis on the revolutionary potential of 
the Third World.
This is the era of socialist revolution in the 
world. In the socialist countries, there is no 
unemployment, no starvation. The entire 
capitalist world, however, is today shaken by a 
profound economic crisis, one which reveals all
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the irrationality and contradictions of 
capitalism. This is not just a "business cycle" 
crisis, it is a crisis of imperialism in 
d e c line. It is directly caused by the wrenching 
effect of waging and losing the war in Vietnam, 
and the challenges now being raised to 
imperialist domination of the world*s resources 
and markets. It is the revelation of these 
defeats in the economies of the U.S. and the rest 
of the capitalist countries. Within the U.S., 
the crisis attacks the working class, with the 
blows falling heaviest on Black and Third World 
people (WUO, April-May, 1976, p. 4).
Indeed, it urged familiarity with Third World conditions and
utopias:
In order to develop this kind of class analysis 
revolutionaries must be willing to organize and 
investigate. People should study the class 
analysis of Puerto Rico done by the Puerto Rican 
Socialist Party as a model. Amilcar Cabral once 
worked as an agromonist in Guine-Bissau, walking 
every inch of his country taking the census as he 
developed a concrete class analysis of society.
Besides organizing, revolutionaries should be 
talking to working people everywhere, checking 
out every picket line you pass, taking notes.
This is not so complicated (WUO, Summer, 1975, p.
6) .
While they probably would not have admitted it, in 
integrating the Third World into their version of Marxism, 
they necessarily recognized Trotsky's "Law of Uneven 
Development" at the expense of more traditional marxist 
interpretations. And although most Weatherpeople were 
Jewish, they seemed to owe more allegiance to this brand of 
international communism than Isreal:
The United States General Assembly voted 
November 10, 1975, to declare Zionism "a form of 
racism and racial discrimination". The WUO 
supports this resolution, supports the right of 
the Palestinian people to self determination in 
their homeland, and condemns the colonial, racist
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and reactionary state of Isreal. Anti-Zionism 
does not equal anti-semitism, nor is Zionism in 
the true or lasting interests of Jewish people.
Zionism is racist because it is colonial (WUO, 
June-July, 1976, p. 3).
Undoubtedly the most serious disagreement with classical 
Marxism was the WUO's image of the American proletariat. In 
fact, instead of an admiring deification - the kind espoused 
by PL - the WUO openly admonished the working class with 
obvious contempt:
. . . we confront the fact that the white 
workers do not constitute the main or the most 
oppressed sections of the work force within the 
worldwide economy of U.S. imperialism: on the
contrary, they form a tiny and the most 
privileged, sector of the proletariat. . .
They also derive invidious sick satisfaction 
out of their feeling that they belong to the top 
nation in the whole world. . . And in the short
run, as long as they remain a reliable mass base 
for imperialism, these material and spiritual 
privileges will be allowed by the ruling 
class. . . (Ono, 1969, p. 2)
As a result, labor unions were particularly 
despicable:
Today, almost everyone in society works in a 
productive process involving a sophisticated 
division of labor. Further, the industrial 
workers in the U.S. have undergone a peculiar 
experience of relative success in organizing for 
and achieving higher wages and near failure in 
the development of the consciousness of a 
political role for the working class. The 
process by which the CIO was built and then 
emasculated and turned into an imperialist front 
should be the subject of great study by the 
left. . . (Jacobs, p. 44)
The Weather Underground Organization then, advanced 
their own version of Marxism-Leninism, more relevant and 
useful to them than the classical variety. But this 
international communism was about as programmatic as the
85.
WUO ever got. In terms of how to make their communist
revolution or what it will be like, they cited Mao: "if you
want knowledge, you must take part in the process of 
changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, 
ou must change that pear by eating it yourself. If you 
want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must 
take part in the revolution." (Jacobs, p. 456)
Directly related to their Marxism-Leninism was the WUO*s 
unrelenting opposition to racism and sexism. In 
appreciation of their (SDS) roots as a civil rights
organization, the WUO was militantly pro-non-white. This
attitude found expression in their solidarity with members 
of the Third World, as well as their support for "political 
prisoners" like Angela Davis and Lolita Lebron. In speaking 
of endogenous American racism, most of their energies were 
directed against anti-blacks:
The spirit of resistance inside the U.S. was 
rekindled by black people. The power and 
strategy of the civil rights movement, S N C C ,
Malcolm X, and the Black Panther Party affected 
all other rebellion. . . The police, the troops,
the sheriffs, the mass arrests and assassinations 
were the official response. The Black movement 
was pushed forward into a revolutionary movement 
for political power, open rebellion and 
confrontation with the racism of white people and 
the racism of institutions (WUO, 1975, p. 6).
Beneath their solidarity with other races, however, was an
almost self-conscious awareness of their own white skin.
They openly characterized themselves as specifically "white
revolutionaries," probably complementing other non-white
revolutionary groups like the Black Panthers and the Brown
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Berets. They were whites, waging war against whites: "Like
Dr. Du Bois said, 'It's our view that white revolutionaries 
should look toward building principled alliances, 
coalitions, and working relationships with Third World 
People when possible'." (WUO, 1975, p. 6)
Coincidental with this variable of anti-sexism was their 
opposition to sexism, calling for a "new women's movement":
We need a women's movement right now unlike 
anything we have built in the last ten years: a
movement of millions of women organized . . .  it 
could fall definitely to the elitist leadership 
of bourgeois women's leadership or be seized by 
revolutionary leadership and take root. . . (WUO,
Winter 1975-1976, p. 2).
Therefore, the struggle began within the WUO itself:
The struggle against male chauvinism and 
supremacy inside the Weather Machine was part of 
a larger process of personal transformation. . .
Sex becomes entirely different without jealousy.
. . Women who never saw themselves making it
with women began digging each other sexually.
People who live together and fight together fuck 
together. What Weatherman is doing is creating 
new standards for men and women to relate to. We 
are trying to make sex non-exploitative as we 
don't use our bodies to control the situation. . .
(Jacobs, p. 325) .
Sex and sexuality - largely in response to the dangers of
sexism - became prominent issues within the WUO. Never,
however, were the Weatherpeople casual enough to draw lines
on the basis of sex: "Another wrong idea is that men are
the enemies of women. This is not true. Capitalism is
women's enemy. . . This is common sense. Women don't live
in a vaccuum." (WUO, Winter, 1975-1976, p. 6). Because of
the large percentage of women within the Weather Underground
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Organization (my estimate ranges in excess of 60%), sex and 
sexism was destined to be an issue dealt with extensively 
and intensely.
For all the components or variables found within the 
utopia of the WUO, however, there was an ongoing emphasis on 
the interrelatedness of all of them. The WUO calls this 
attitude "anti-separatist":
Weatherman is also anti-separatist. It 
believes a separate women's movement is 
likely to fail . . . the fight can best
be waged by . . . struggling together. .
. (Jacobs, p. 303).
The tendency then, was to see all components mentioned so
far as being interrelated and connected. Hence, it is
impossible to view women, blacks, or workers outside of
their overarching emphasis on class analysis. It is
manipulation and exploitation which keep the capitalist
system functioning. Since the system is of unmitigated
evil, the alternative must be of unparalleled good, while
still creating and fermenting optimum revolutionary
conditions. To achieve this alternative, the WUO adopted
communality in everything. This is the sixth and final
variable in their utopia.
Directives and discipline begin at the Weather Bureau; 
were passed on to the various regional offices; on to each 
collective (two to twenty people); and ultimately to the 
above-ground support apparatus (AGSA). The best example of 
the WUO's communality was found at the collective level.
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Here, communism was the rule. Everything was shared - 
private property was non-existent. Food, automobiles, 
drugs, music, explosives, even sex, were shared communally:
At the same time our monogamous relationships 
broke up because we simply didn't need them any 
more . . .  We began . . .  to become total human 
beings . . . our point of existence was the
revolution; and the old way of life became 
intolerable to us (Jacobs, p. 324).
Sexual alternatives were not always welcomed, however:
(to) replace the antiquated monogamous 
relationships were group gropes, homosexuality, 
autosexuality, or asexuality. . . Although the 
Bureau continued to send . . . instructions for 
us to smash our monogamy, little was done about 
it. . . (Stern, p. 115).
Living together, eating together, fighting together, 
sleeping together was supposed to weld a number of 
individuals into a collective fighting force. But even this 
was not adequate. All individual pursuits were to be 
subdued to further the revolution. To do this, 
self-criticism--one of the most hated parts of the Weather 
utopia (by the WUO) was introduced. The intellectual 
origins of this method can probably be traced back to 
Stalin. Under him, self-criticism was introduced not only 
into political practice, but also into political doctrine. 
Stalin defined the concept as a "Bolshevik" method of 
training the forces of the party and "an indispensable and 
permanent weapon in the arsenal of Bolshevism" (Stalin,
1921, p. 2). The objective of self-criticism was the 
elimination of certain mistakes and shortcomings in the
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Party, in order "to promote the Party spirit" and "to 
consolidate the Soviet regime" (Stalin, p. 2). Stalin later 
added that without self-criticism "we cannot advance the 
cause of building socialism and of curbing the wrecking 
activities of the bourgeoisie" (Stalin, p. 3). Mao added, 
"Inner-Party criticism is a weapon for strengthening the 
Party organization and increasing its fighting capacity" 
(Quotations from Chairman M a o , p. 38). He also said,
"Another point that should be mentioned in connection with 
inner-Party criticism is that some comrades ignore the major 
issues and confine their attention to minor, personal points 
when they make their criticism" (Mao, 1955, p. 121). Often, 
the WUO did not heed Mao's latter quote.
Criticism sessions in a collective would require the 
group to meet and begin criticizing themselves and their 
comrades, the purpose of which was to eliminate potentially 
counterrevolutionary attitudes from forming. Instead, it 
very often wrecked human beings:
It was the loneliest, most morbid time of my 
life. I literally lost my will to live. Every 
day I was criticized for something, and 1 smiled 
vaguely and agreed. And believe me, I agreed. I 
had been convinced, over a period of a month, 
that I was the most racist anti-Communist, the 
worst sexual deviate, the most blighted 
egotistical wretch, the greatest anti-Womenls 
Liberationist, the most exulting warmonger, and 
the weakest, most selfish, least desirable person 
that had ever lived. I was warped and unfit for 
Weatherman. I was dirty and like the rotten 
apple in the barrel, spoiled everyone I came in 
contact with. People were told, as we had just
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been told with Justesen, not to touch me, not to 
talk to m e . I was in the caste of the 
untouchables, and no one recognized my existence, 
let alone my needs. I tottered on the edge of 
total despair and loaded myself with downers, 
until I couldn't walk, couldn't think. . . Then 
started my last criticism session, the worst I 
have ever been through. For these were the 
people who loven me most, and from their mouths 
poured all the venom I had heard so many times 
before. Humbled, and disgusted with myself, I 
could finally see how unready I was for 
Weatherman, how weak I was, how shallow, how 
defeated (Stern, p. 247).
More often than not, this criticism was divisive--splitting
collectives amongst themselves. Mark Rudd was considered
particularly adept at criticizing people - making him the
only member of the Weather Bureau who has ever been widely
hated by the WUO members at large (Stern, pp. 111-115).
While self-criticism still existed - and in a more
appropriate way - its divisiveness was perceived early in
1974 and revised:
Weatherpeople learned, after much mental 
anguish and personal sacrifice, that turning 
yourself inside out is not the same thing as 
turning yourself into a revolutionary, that 
seeing the world with fresh eyes does not mean 
you are looking in the right direction. If it is 
true, as Marcuse has argued, that making a 
revolution requires the union of a "new 
sensibility with a new rationality," it is no 
less true that the struggle to become 
revolutionary must be limited by the exigencies 
of liberation. Marcuse's mistake is to stress 
the need to develop a new sensibility while 
ignoring the importance of overcoming the 
softness of the white left. Weatherman errs just 
as much in the opposite direction. Che, whose 
main concern was establishing the New Man in 
Cuba, posed the problem properly: "we must grow
tough, but without ever losing our tenderness."
In contrast, Weatherman's revolt against
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bourgeois values often resulted neither in their 
negation nor in Weatherman's incorporation of 
socialist values (Jacobs, p. 307).
These then are six distinct variables - chiliasm,
violence, communism, communality, anti-racism and
anti-sexism - elucidating the thought of the Weather
Underground Organization. It is a thought which must be
considered "utopian" because it is incongruous with the
world around them. It certainly is not ideological, as it
never attempts to justify the power structure; instead, it
"explains" it - in WUO terms.
CONCLUSIONS
What has been illustrated throughout the course of this 
exercise is a kind of socio-historical determinism. As 
Mannheim tells us:
. . . the sociology of knowledge seeks to
comprehend thought in the concrete setting of an
historical - social situation out of which 
individually differentiated thought only very 
gradually emerges . . .  it does not sever the 
concretely existing modes of thought from the 
context of collective action. . . (Mannheim, p. 3)
While it is probably true that no one method of
investigation will be meaningful to all (because of the
varieties of individual experience - a Jamesian, and later,
Mannheimian tenet), certain advantages can be pointed out in
Mannheim's approach.
First, it assumes very little because of its historical
nature. Strongly influenced by Hegel, Mannheim's method
puts the problem of understanding into history. By
understanding where an idea "began" as well as the variables
which influenced it, a better understanding of the nature of
the idea can be obtained. Second, Mannheim's method offers
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a typology. Using this Weberian device, it is easier to 
discuss certain phenomena. This is grounded in the belief 
that any vocabulary must have commonality and universality 
to be utilized to any appreciable degree. By calling an 
idea "conservative" rather than "chiliastic," we develop a 
common ground of meaning. Third, and most importantly, 
Mannheim's method demands a certain degree of objectivity.
For example, if the WUO would simply be considered "sick," 
what would be gained? "Sick" and "foolish" predispose the 
scholar away from determining why it may be "sick" or 
"foolish." In this way, sociology may someday be able to 
control - or at least explain - human interaction. While 
different beliefs of the WUO and various actions by the WUO 
have been observed and analyzed sociologically, the primary 
sociological lesson of this exercise has yet to be fully 
stated - that sociologically there is no such thing as 
"chance." Everything done and believed by the WUO had a 
cause and an effect.
For example, let us arbitrarily select an event - the 
bombing of the Pentagon. It did not just happen, and to 
assume it did would be ultimately anti-intellectual.
Rather, many things contributed to the bombing - the W U O 's 
utopia, the Cambodian incursion, the availability of the 
four Weatherpeople who did it, etc. And, these things, in 
turn, had their causes. It had its effects, if not 
necessarily those desired by the WUO. The event contributed
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to the WUO's myth of invincibility - as well as its
estrangement from the Left. It also heightened the
awareness of the "status-quo," making them perhaps a bit 
more cautious - if only in their guarding of the Pentagon.
To deductively prove causality is a different, more complex 
matter - well beyond the scope of this exercise.
Looking past the study of mobilization and its 
conclusions, the serious scholar will probably detect 
potential contradictions in Mannheim, and, therefore, this 
exercise. Mannheim realizes this:
If there are contradictions and inconsistencies 
in my paper this is I think, not so much due to 
the fact that I overlooked them but because I 
make a point of developing a theme to its end 
even if it contradicts some other statements. I 
use this method because I think that in this
marginal field of human knowledge we should not
conceal our inconsistencies, so to speak covering 
up the wounds, but our duty is to show the sore 
spots in human thinking at its present stage . .
. these inconsistencies are the thorn in the 
flesh from which we have to start (Coser, 1953, 
pp. 429-430) .
That is true of this exercise as well. No attempt has been 
made to evaluate the Weather Underground, only to study them 
within some sociologically-defined categories. Facts 
considered to be salient by some have been omitted and facts 
considered by others to be irrelevent have been included.
To those, I encourage a more probing investigation, or at 
least a replication of this study.
A final matter to be considered is the relationship 
between mobilization and changes in the utopian mentality. 
They are reflected by each other, and if the particular
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movement is to survive, the utopian mentality and 
strategy/means of mobilization must be consistent with each 
other. For example, if a mentality is chiliastic, it is 
likely that the accompanying strategy would, therefore, have 
a sense of urgency about it. As the "critical moment" 
passes without the armageddon, and the chiliasm is diluted, 
it is likely that the strategy and/or mobilization would 
lose some urgency. As chiliasm lapses into, say, the 
liberal~democratic idea, the strategy would then also change 
to say, an educational one. It should be remembered, 
however, that this relationship between idea and strategy is 
just as solid when the variables are reversed. That is, 
when a change in strategy is forced, it is likely that this 
will also alter the basic idea. This can be seen readily in 
this study.
The Days of Rage over, the WUO came face to face with 
the fact that the Left was not about to follow them into 
street combat; hence, a strategy change was forced. The WUO 
then went underground, engaging in "symbolic bombings."
This strategy change was accompanied by a change in the 
Weather Underground's utopian mentality from confrontational 
to educational. It was, as Dohrn called it, "the military 
error." This is but one example. Gamson (1975, pp. 87-88) 
pointed out that although violence is often an effective 
tool, it is/effective only towards achieving limited, short
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term goals. The WUO, with their goal being large-scale 
revolution, was not ultimately successful with their 
violence.
The Weather Underground Organization then, was the 
perfectly logical and rational culmination of the variables 
discussed. Its birth, life, and death were virtually 
inevitable. It was never irrational, pathological, or 
illogical.
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